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Abstract 
One of the core issues in the debate on a future Constitution within the framework of the 
European Convention was the reform of competences. On 29 October 2004, the Heads of 
State or Government signed the outcome of the reform process, the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. With regard to the fundamentals of the competence system, namely 
the attribution and control of competences, as well as the definition of competence 
categories, the Constitutional Treaty essentially codifies the present acquis communautaire. 
In the field of external action, however, it introduces significant amendments that might have 
a considerable impact on the balance of powers within the European Union. This paper 
analyses these changes. It looks at the potential implications of the institutional amendments 
regarding the new post of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the strengthened role of 
the European Council, as well as the newly defined principles and objectives of the Union’s 
external action. Further emphasis is placed on the scope of the Union’s external powers 
following the incorporation of the principle of implied powers, as well as an analysis of the 
individual competence provisions in Title V of the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
1 Europainstitut 
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration  
Althanstr. 39-45/2/3 
1090 Wien, Austria 
E-mail: angelika.hable@wu-wien.ac.at 
                                                 
* This paper represents a compilation of the results that emerged in the framework of two research 
projects. One was the EI research project “The 2004 EU Intergovernmental Conference and the 
Constitutional Debate in Europe“, financed by the “Jubiläums Fonds” of the Austrian National Bank 
(Oesterreichische Nationalbank). The second project was conducted in the framework of the IGC-
Net, a European Network of Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence, financially supported by the 
European Commission and related to the “Anatomy, Analysis and Assessment of the EU 
Constitutionalisation: studying constitutional reforms from the European Convention to the 
Constitutional Treaty”. 
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I. Introduction 
One of the core issues in the debate on a future Constitution within the framework of the 
European Convention was the reform of competences. The mandate in the Laeken 
Declaration1 for this section of the constitutional debate was broad: It called for more 
transparency in the division of competences and requested an evaluation of the need for any 
reorganisation of competence. Furthermore, while preserving the European dynamic, it 
called for a guarantee that a redefined division of competence would not lead to a creeping 
expansion of the Union’s competences or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of 
competence of the Member States or regions. Regarding external relations, the Laeken 
Declaration postulated a more coherent approach and raised the question of whether 
Europe, being finally unified, has a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power 
able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries 
and peoples.  
The result of the reform procedure, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe2 
(hereafter: “CT” or “Constitutional Treaty”) was signed by the Heads of State or Government 
on 29 October 2004. Subject certainly to a positive outcome of the ratification procedure and, 
particularly, the referenda held in different Member States, the CT might constitute the future 
legislative framework determining the Member States’ economic and political margin of 
manoeuvre. With a view to the reform of competences, it may be argued that the CT does 
not contain substantive changes regarding the foundations of the system, namely the 
constitutional structure of the distribution and control of competences. Also with regard to the 
definition of competence categories and the attribution of competences, the Constitutional 
Treaty mainly codifies the present acquis communautaire and the distinction developed by 
academia.3  It thereby essentially contributes to enhancing clarity and transparency, but does 
not entail important changes to the system of competences. Significant amendments, 
however, have been introduced in the field of external action that yield considerable impact 
on the balance of powers within the European Union. 
The objective of this paper is, thus, an analysis of the Union’s external competences in the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. It addresses the proposed institutional changes 
in the field of external relations and the newly defined principles and objectives of the Union’s 
                                                 
* The author wishes to thank Professor Stefan Griller for his valuable suggestions and support. 
1 European Council, Declaration on the Future of the European Union, 15 December 2001, SN300/01. 
2 Official Journal 2004/C 310/01 of 16 December 2004. 
3 Compare, for example, Bogdandy/Bast, 2002, Craig, 2004, Dougan, 2004, Lenaerts/Desomer, 2002; 
Pernice, 2002, de Witte, 2002 and 2003, Mayer, 2004, CONV 375/1/02, REV 1, 2002; Lamassoure-
Report, 2002.  
. 
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external action. Further emphasis is placed on the scope of the Union’s external powers 
following the incorporation of the principle of implied powers in the Constitutional Treaty. The 
final and most comprehensive chapter deals with the individual competence provisions in 
Title V, Part III of the CT, the section on the Union’s external action and the relevant changes 
proposed in each field.  
A closer look at the Laeken Declaration reveals that the mandate for reform regarding the 
Union’s external relations was more than challenging. It calls the Union “to shoulder its 
responsibilities in the governance of globalisation, […] to play the role of a power wanting to 
change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but 
also the poorest […] and a power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in 
other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development”. Within the European 
Convention, three Working Groups dealt specifically with external relations, namely the 
Groups on Legal Personality, as well as Defence and External Action focusing on the nature 
of the Union and its role in the outside world. In addition, the Working Groups on 
Complementary Competences and Simplification also touched upon the Union’s external 
competences and the respective applicable instruments, specifically in the field of CFSP.4   
As a result of deliberations, the CT entails a new structure and considerable amendments in 
the field of the Union’s external relations. In the light of a stronger coherence, the CT now 
regulates the thrust of the Union’s competences in the external sphere in one chapter in Part 
III, Title V on “The Union’s external action” (Art III-292 to III-329 CT). Yet, beyond this 
chapter, there are several provisions referring to the Union’s external relations. They 
concern, on the one hand, the basic principles, objectives, and institutional aspects 
contained in Part I of the draft. On the other hand, the Constitutional Treaty contains a range 
of competence provisions outside Title V that confer external powers upon the Union. 
Several important changes that will apply to the Union’s external competences may be 
attributed to the amendments in Part I CT as well as to the general provisions applicable to 
the Union's external relations regulated in Part III. Moreover, the inclusion of new 
competence provisions in Part III and the amendment of existing ones, such as particularly 
the provision on the conclusion of international agreements yield the potential to alter the 
Union's position in the outside world.   
II. Principles and Objectives of the Union’s External Action 
In accordance with the general structure of the CT, Part I contains the constitutional 
foundations for the Union’s external competences. Several amendments included in this Part 
                                                 
4 Regarding the final reports and the working documents of the different Convention Working Groups, 
please refer to http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/contrib/conv_en.htm.  
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have a direct impact on the Union’s external competences, its underlying procedures and 
implementation.  
A pivotal point regarding the Union’s future external relations is certainly the proposal to 
introduce a single legal personality, which assumes the rights and obligations of the 
European Community and the Union (Art I-7 CT). It comes together with the merging of the 
pillars, the consolidation of the EC- and EU-Treaties and the consequential embedding of the 
CFSP in one single legal framework. In line with the organisational restructuring, the ambition 
to provide for better coherence has also extended to the institutional side, specifically 
regarding the Union’s external representation and a largely uniform procedure for the 
conclusion and negotiation of international agreements. At the same time, the formulation of 
common principles and objectives for the Union’s external action adds a new tone to the 
Union’s external relations.  
As Article IV-438 CT stipulates, the Union will succeed to all the rights and obligations of the 
European Community and of the European Union, whether internal or resulting from 
international agreements. This should clarify the Union’s current ambiguous position in its 
representation to the outside world, where legal personality is only explicitly awarded to the 
European Communities and not to the European Union, despite its competences, inter alia, 
to conclude international agreements under Article 24 TEU. Whilst a single legal personality 
undoubtedly simplifies the current situation by providing a uniform appearance for the Union, 
it raises at the same time a number of questions, specifically with regard to the conclusion of 
international agreements in the field of CFSP under the new regime.  
Also, the joint definition of general principles and objectives for all fields of EU external action 
reflects the Convention’s intention to enhance clarity and transparency to the public and the 
EU’s partners. In order to ensure consistency in EU external and internal action, the 
consideration of these principles and objectives will generally extend to all external aspects 
of EU internal policies. It finds its first expression in the CT in an amendment to the Union’s 
objectives, stipulating that the Union “in its relations with the wider world, […] shall uphold 
and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, 
as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” (Art I-3 para 4 CT). 
The formulation of these objectives that should inspire the Union’s action on the international 
scene clearly follows the mandate of the Laeken Declaration to set globalisation within a 
moral framework. These principles and values are reiterated in more detail in the general 
provisions of Title V on the Union’s External Action. Article III-292 CT formulates a common 
THE REFORM OF COMPETENCES IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS                                                 8 
   
set of objectives for the entire field of external relations. Instead of different objectives for the 
various fields of external action, such as the CFSP, the CCP, development cooperation, etc., 
the principles and objectives formulated in Article III-292 CT will generally apply in the 
development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action, as well 
as the external aspects of its other policies. As Cremona observes, this will in the future 
require a delicate balancing of possibly conflicting objectives and interests, if for example the 
CCP will, next to its objective of abolishing restrictions in international trade, in the future also 
have an explicit sustainable development and human rights mandate (Cremona 2003: 1349). 
III. The Institutions in the Framework of External Relations 
III.1. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs 
The ambition to enhance coherence and efficiency has also extended to the institutional side. 
Notably, it was envisaged that for stronger consistency and coherence between foreign 
policy decisions and instruments in the field of external relations would be provided for. To 
this end, the CT proposes the reconsideration of the roles of the High Representative for 
CFSP and the Commissioner responsible for external relations and led to the creation of the 
post of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (Art I-28 CT). The Foreign Minister, who is to be 
appointed by the European Council with the agreement of the Commission President, will 
simultaneously be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission and chair the Foreign 
Affairs Council.5 His/her tasks include conducting the Union’s common foreign and security 
policy, as well as the common security and defence policy, which he/she will carry out as 
mandated by the Council of Ministers. In his responsibility as Vice President of the 
Commission, he/she will ensure the consistency of the Union's external action and will be 
responsible for handling external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's 
external action (Art I-28 CT). As Griller observes, however, it is doubtful whether the 
ostensible uniformity of the Foreign Minister’s post may compensate for the weaknesses 
inherent in the draft, as the rules applicable to the CFSP and the other areas of external 
action forming part of the current first pillar have not been consolidated.6 Despite the 
outwardly unified structure, basically the same (considerable) differences regarding the 
procedures, legal instruments, and organs involved in the decision making process apply as 
is presently the case. Given the frequent tensions between the two institutions, the Foreign 
Minister might face considerable difficulties in reconciling diverging political interests. To 
represent a coherent picture of the Union towards the outside world will, therefore, constitute 
the major challenge and, at the same time, the essence of the Foreign Minister’s task. To this 
                                                 
5 The CT proposes to legally anchor the establishment of a specific Foreign Affairs Council (Art I-24 
para 3), formally distinct from the General Affairs formation, which will be headed by the Foreign 
Minister. 
6 Compare Griller in de Witte, 2003: 142ff. 
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end, the Union delegations, which represent the Union in third countries and international 
organisations, will also be placed under his authority (Art III-328 CT).7  
Given this considerable workload, much of the Foreign Minister’s success will depend on the 
efficient installation of the European External Action Service, which is foreseen for his 
assistance. It will be composed of officials from relevant departments of the General 
Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission, as well as staff seconded from national 
diplomatic services and will support the Foreign Minister in “fulfilling his mandate” (Art III-296 
para 3 CT). The institutional embedding of the European External Action Service and the 
scope of its tasks, however, is not yet specified and will remain subject to European decision. 
With a view to its composition, it might serve as the ideal forum for the practical realisation of 
the consistency obligation of Council and Commission in the field of external action (Art III-
292 CT). In this respect, it will certainly be enlightening, under whose authority, or 
respectively structural affiliation, the European External Action Service will be established, 
the Council’s or the Commission’s or, alternatively, whether it will rest solely under the 
authority of the Foreign Minister. In summary, it seems almost needless to say that the 
Foreign Minister will hold an enormously influential position in the future institutional 
framework. With a view to the powers unified in this single new post, it must also be 
observed, however, that the Foreign Minister would hold the potential of policy determination 
and execution in one hand, which might considerably blur the separation of powers with the 
Union’s institutions (Griller, 2003:147). 
In this regard, the Foreign Minister’s relationship to the President of the European Council 
and the Commission President will be an issue of interest for the future inter-institutional 
balance.  Both have considerable competences in the field of external relations and the 
division of labour is not clearly delimitated. The proposed permanent European Council chair 
will be elected for a, once renewable, two and a half year term. The European Council 
President “shall, at his or her level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of 
the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to 
the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” (Art I-22 para 2 CT). The European 
Commission, in turn, shall, with the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and 
other cases provided for in the Constitution, ensure the Union’s external representation (Art I-
26 para 1 CT). The President of the Commission has to ensure that the Commission acts 
                                                 
7 At present, both the Council and Commission represent the EU in third countries – on the one hand 
by the diplomatic representation of the country holding the Presidency and, on the other hand, by the 
EU delegations represented in 128 third countries. By introducing a single legal personality, the 
delegations, which are currently mandated by the Community, would become veritable Union 
delegations. As Duke, points out, it is not clear under the draft Constitution, who assumes the former 
role of the Presidency regarding its diplomatic representative function. He argues, however, that the 
changes in the institutional structure will have the effect of considerably eroding the significance of the 
Presidency in external relations (Duke, 2002:19). 
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“consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body” which will not be an easy challenge to 
perform, given the vast field of external relations, and even more importantly, given that also 
the Union Foreign Minister forms part of the Commission (Duke, 2002:17). 
III.2. The European Council’s Role in the Field of External Action 
The implications of these institutional amendments will not be dealt with in more detail in the 
framework of this paper. There is one proposal, however, that merits further attention, as it 
might contribute to significantly shifting the balance of powers between the EU institutions. It 
concerns the increase of the European Council's powers in the field of external action. Whilst 
already under the current regime, the European Council is entitled to define common 
strategies under Article 13 para 2 TEU, these strategies are, however, limited to the field of 
CFSP. The CT empowers the European Council to identify, on the basis of the (newly 
defined) principles and objectives in the field of external relations (Art III-292 CT), the 
strategic interests and objectives of the Union. The European Council will thereby act by way 
of European decisions, thus legally binding acts which “shall relate to the CFSP and to other 
areas of the external action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the 
Union with a specific country or region, or may be thematic in approach”  
(Art III-293 para 1 CT). The Union institutions, as well as the Member States, would 
consequently be subordinated to such decisions of the European Council which set the 
guidelines for the entire area of external action. Such decisions, though not even legislative 
acts in the definition of Art I-33 CT, would spearhead the hierarchy of norms in the respective 
fields. Therefore, even in those areas which now form part of the first pillar and are subject to 
the so-called “Community method”, the foundations for legislative action are set by an 
“intergovernmental mechanism”, namely the European Council acting unanimously.8 
Admittedly, under the current regime, the European Council has not made extensive use of 
its power under the CFSP. It rather laid down the strategic guidelines applicable in the CFSP 
under Article 13.1 TEU, thus acted by legally non-binding instruments. On the other hand, it 
could be suggested that the resolutions adopted by the European Council have frequently 
transcended a mere guideline-function and established detailed rules for legislative action in 
the policy fields concerned. This applies even more to the Presidency conclusions, which are 
likewise legally non-binding, but which the European Council has efficiently used to boost the 
institutional and legal setting of the CFSP and the CSDP.9 With a view to the current 
                                                 
8 See Griller in de Witte, 2003: 133-157: ‘If the respective powers of the European Council follow the 
decision making procedures of the CFSP, such a mechanism would entail, to the extent that the latter 
would remain intergovernmental in nature, the “intergovernmentalisation” of external policies in 
general, including what currently comes under the first pillar. In essence, this would not enhance, but 
rather deteriorate the capacity of the Union to take efficient action in the field of external relations.’ 
9 Compare Blanck 2004:131ff referring in particular to the Presidency Conclusions of Helsinki (1999, 
Headline Goal), Feira (2000, Civil Headline Goal) and Nice (2000, Establishment of permanent bodies, 
such as the PSC).    
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proposal, it thus seems conceivable that the European Council will be tempted to refer to this 
power more frequently, given that it allows defining the path for the entire field of external 
relations. With regard to these extensive powers, it constituted a striking, constitutional deficit 
that in the original version of the CT, acts of the European Council were not subject to review 
by the ECJ under current Art 230 TCE. This shortcoming was discussed during the IGC. The 
new Art III-365 para 1 CT provides that legal acts adopted by the European Council, which 
are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties will, in the future, be subject to 
judicial control by the Court of Justice.10 This acknowledges the dominant function of the 
European Council, in its capacity of issuing legally binding decisions, and to some extent 
mitigates the deficit in the rule of law inherent in the CT. For some time during the 
negotiations in the IGC, it even seemed that the ECJ’s control might apply without restriction, 
including decisions or parts of decisions that relate to the CFSP. However, in the final version 
of the CT, the provision excluding jurisdiction of the ECJ in the CFSP (Art III-376 CT) has 
been once more amended and now refers explicitly to Art III-293 CT.11 Thus, the review of 
legality is limited to acts by the European Council producing legal effects vis-à-vis third 
parties, and may only refer to those parts of an act which do not relate to the CFSP. This is 
highly unfortunate given that a comparable review exists with respect to restrictive measures 
by the Council against natural or legal persons in the CFSP (Art III-322 and III-376) and 
given the impressive powers that the CT bestows upon the European Council. The (albeit 
limited) control of the ECJ could have been regarded as an indispensable counterbalance. 
Moreover, it is questionable how the ECJ, in the case of a review of legal acts on the basis of 
Art III-293 will draw a meaningful delimitation between the parts of a European decision 
which relate to the CFSP and other fields of external relations. With a view to the 
requirement for unanimity in this provision and the potentially psychological hurdle of 
adopting legally binding measures, one may hope that this extensive power of the European 
Council will not also be excessively exploited in the traditional supranational fields.  
IV. Implied Competences in the Field of International Agreements 
IV.1. Introduction  
Whilst the amendments relating to the European Council might imply the danger of a 
stronger “intergovernmental” influence in external relations, the CT in turn contains proposals 
that limit the Member States’ external powers to a considerable degree. One of these 
proposals concerns the Common Commercial Policy which will be dealt with below. Another 
concerns the conclusion of international agreements, one of the key issues regarding the 
division of competences in the field of external action. The complexity of the system of 
                                                 
10 CIG 52/1/03 REV1, p.5 and CIG 52/03ADD 1, Annex 7 (Article III-270(1)).       
11 CIG 79/04, Annex 24. 
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external competences is particularly due to the fact that, besides competence provisions 
explicitly conferring external powers in the Treaty, external competences may also arise 
implicitly through provisions of the Treaty or secondary law. Since its decision in the AETR 
Case, it has been acknowledged that external competences may arise not only through an 
express conferment by the Treaty but “may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty 
and from measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the Community 
institutions.”12 On the basis of this decision, the ECJ has developed a subtle jurisdiction with 
its most recent refinement in the Open Skies judgments. The European Convention has 
apparently resolved to render the implied external competences explicit and attempted to 
incorporate the jurisprudence of the Court in the CT. In the current version, however, it 
seems that this codification has resulted either in a not entirely successful translation of the 
principle or a projected, significant development of the Court's jurisprudence.  
Generally, for external competences the same principles and the same definition of 
competence categories, exclusive and shared competences as well as areas of supporting, 
coordinating or complementary action, apply. Exclusive external competence, for example 
the Common Commercial Policy or the monetary policy for the Member States whose 
currency is the euro (Art I-13 para 1(c) and Art III-195ff CT)13 excludes any action by the 
Member States at the external level, thus the conclusion of international agreements in the 
fields covered by the CT. In the area of shared external competences, such as for example 
environment (Art III-233 para 4 CT), Member States may exercise their external competence 
to the extent that the Union has not exercised or decided to cease exercising its competence. 
Interestingly, the CT does not foresee specific external competences in the area of 
supporting, coordinating or complementary action. The area of development cooperation (Art 
III-316 CT, now amended by an additional humanitarian aid competence) has been assigned 
as shared competence, with the significant clarification, however, that the exercise of Union 
competence in that field does not prevent Member States from exercising theirs (Art I-14 
para 4 CT). The same applies to the areas of research, technological development and 
space (Art I-14 para 3 CT). As the essential dividing line between shared competences and 
supporting, coordinating or complementary action is the exclusion of pre-emption in the latter 
category (Art I-12 para 5), the competence attribution in this regard is not entirely meaningful.  
With regard to implied external competences, it has, through all the Court’s deliberations in 
this context, been difficult to distinguish the existence and the scope of competences. In the 
Open Skies judgments, the Court has resumed its previous approach and, unfortunately not 
in an entirely coherent way, listed the situations under which exclusive external competences 
                                                 
12 C-22/70, Commission of the European Communities vs Council of the European Communities, 
European Agreement on Road Transport, ECR 1971/263, para 16. 
13 For a thorough discussion on the economic aspects of the EMU and the Union’s external 
representation in this area, compare Breuss (2005).  
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may arise.14 In contrast, it is up to the present subject to dispute whether the Court admits 
the concept of implied concurrent, or under the CT's terminology, shared competences. The 
following pages will, therefore, provide an outline of the Court’s main findings in the 
development of its jurisprudence on implied competences. It should serve to facilitate the 
understanding of the Convention’s draft on implied competences and at the same time 
emphasise the scope of its proposal in comparison to the principles developed by the Court.  
IV.2. Excursus: Clarifying Implied External Competences?  
 The ECJ’s Jurisprudence 
In the AETR case15, the ECJ has specified for the first time, in which cases external powers 
may be conferred upon the Community. “In particular each time the Community, with a view 
to implementing a common policy envisaged by the Treaty adopts provisions laying down 
common rules, whatever forms these may take, the Member States no longer have the right, 
acting individually or collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect 
those rules” (para 17). The Court concludes that “to the extent to which Community rules are 
promulgated for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, the Member States cannot, 
outside the framework of the Community institutions, assume obligations which might affect 
those rules or alter their scope” (para 22). It thus implicitly states that in such case, the 
Member States’ power to act is pre-empted.  
The existence of implied competences was confirmed in the ECJ’s judgment in Kramer16. 
The reasoning of the Court in this case was, however, essentially determined by the 
substance of the international agreement in question. It stated that stemming from provisions 
of the Treaty and of secondary law, the Community possesses powers at the internal level, 
namely the power to take any measures for the conservation of biological resources of the 
sea. It stated further that, at an international level, the only way to ensure the conservation of 
these resources both effectively and equitably was through a system of rules binding on all 
the States concerned, including non-member countries. The Court concluded that “in these 
circumstances it follows from the very duties and powers which the Community law has 
established and assigned to the institutions of the Community in the internal level that the 
Community has authority to enter into international commitments […]” (Kramer para 30/33).  
A further specification and clarification of the foregoing judgements was contained in Opinion 
1/7617. The Court confirms that “whenever Community Law has created for the institutions of 
the Community powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific 
                                                 
14 Compare as one example for the essentially identical set of judgments C-475/98, 
Commission/Austria (Open-Skies-Agreements), ECR 2002/ I-9797. 
15 C-22/70, supra note 12; in the following section, the references to paragraphs in the text refer to the 
respective passages of the analysed judgments.  
16 Cases C-3, 4 and 6/76, Cornelis Kramer and others, ECR 1976/1279.  
17 Opinion 1/76 of 26 April 1977, ECR 1977/741. 
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objective, the Community has authority to enter into the international commitments 
necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence of an express provision in 
that connexion.” (para 3) In confirmation of the AETR doctrine, it states that “this is 
particularly so in all cases in which internal power has already been used in order to adopt 
measures which come within the attainment of common policies.” The Court, however, 
further clarified that this was not limited to that eventuality. In the underlying case in question, 
the internal Community measures were only adopted at the same time as the international 
agreement was concluded. The Court determined that “the power to bind the Community vis-
à-vis third countries nevertheless flows by implication from the provisions of the Treaty 
creating the internal power and in so far as the participation of the Community in the 
international agreement is […] necessary for the attainment of one of the objectives of the 
Community.” (para 4). Under the cited circumstances, the necessity was rooted in the fact 
that it would have been impossible to fully attain the objective pursued by internal means, 
namely to attain the common transport policy and more specifically to organise the 
navigation on the Rhine, without bringing Switzerland, as a third country into the scheme in 
question by means of an international agreement. Opinion 1/76 thus determines the 
requirements for implied external competences on the basis of Treaty provisions, if 
secondary law has not yet been adopted. Remarkably, neither of these two decisions 
contained a clear statement as to the scope of the respective implied competence, in 
particular whether it conferred exclusive competence on the Union.   
The subsequent Opinion 2/9118, relating to the ILO-Convention 170 regarding chemicals in 
the workplace, also built on these findings. Moreover, it not only contained important 
clarifications on the scope of the Community’s competence, but also provided strong 
indications for the existence of concurrent implied competences. The Court firstly set up its 
scheme of analysis by summarizing its previous findings. It stated that the competence to 
enter into international agreements may flow implicitly from Treaty provisions, in particular 
whenever Community law creates Community powers within its internal system for the 
purpose of attaining a specific objective, insofar as the international commitments are 
necessary for the attainment of that objective. In referring to Kramer, the Court added that 
furthermore such competence “could flow by implication from other measures adopted by the 
Community institutions within the framework of the Treaty provisions or the acts of 
accession“ (para 7). In the case in question, the Court referred to Art 118a TEC as internal 
legislative competence to adopt minimum requirements in the field of social policy. 
Interestingly, the Court concluded with reference to this internal legislative competence that 
the Community had competence to conclude Convention 170 (para 17).  
                                                 
18 Opinion 2/91 of 19 March 1993,ECR 1993/I-1061.  
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Only in a second step, “for the purpose of determining whether this competence is exclusive 
in nature”, the Court referred to the AETR doctrine and examined whether the provisions of 
Convention 170 were of such a kind as to affect rules adopted pursuant to Art 118a (para 9 
and para 18).19 Ultimately, exclusive EC competence was ruled out by the Court (para 18ff), 
which led several voices in the relevant literature to conclude that the Court, in justifying 
competence on the basis of the internal legislative competence, must have referred to 
concurrent implied competences.   
This conclusion, therefore, led to the discussion of in which circumstances concurrent implied 
competences may be based on internal legislative competences, if one excludes that the 
Court intended to establish an (automatic) parallelism between internal and external 
legislative competences. Griller and Gamharter suggest that the ECJ’s statement in Opinion 
1/76, as developed by Opinion 2/91, results in two concepts of “necessity” for the 
establishment of implied EC competences.20 Exclusive external competences would arise in 
the situation of the inland waterway vessels, where the conclusion of an international 
agreement is “inextricably linked” to the adoption of internal measures for the attainment of a 
Community objective. Concurrent competence might be implied in all cases “where the 
attainment of a Community goal is merely facilitated by the conclusion of an international 
agreement, ensuring the optimal use of an internal competence by the EC.”21 This 
interpretation draws a necessary link to the Treaty objectives, such as for example the 
internal market objectives. In practice, it particularly addresses the “right of first admittance” 
of third country nationals in a Member State, i.e. the regulations which determine the 
conditions for the establishment of third country nationals in a Member State. Under the 
current regime of external competences with a view to the present concept of the Common 
Commercial Policy, it is upon the Member States to regulate the “right of first admittance” by 
national law. Evidently, diverging regulations in the Member States may lead to distortions in 
competition, for example with regard to the diverging conditions for the establishment of 
foreign undertakings and might equally impede EC measures to the extent that these refer to 
the treatment of third country nationals. To the extent that the conclusion of international 
agreements in such situations usually facilitates the attainment of a Community objective, 
internal legislative competences will imply an external concurrent Community competence. 
The systematic implementation of the Court’s previous findings in Opinion 2/91, which had 
permitted a clearer distinction between the existence and scope of implied competences, 
                                                 
19 The Court finally also acknowledged that an international agreement may be adopted in an area 
where competence is shared between the Community and the Member States without, however, 
providing any guidelines as to the demarcation between exclusive and shared competences (para 12). 
20 Griller/Gamharter in Griller/Weidel, 2002, 79f. 
21 Griller/Gamharter in Griller/Weidel, 2002, 79f, compare also Dashwood/Heliskoski (2000) and 
Dashwood (2000); differently Eeckhout (2003). 
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thus opened the door for the discussion on concurrent (implied) competences. It is notable 
that in its subsequent Opinions and judgments, the Court neither confirmed nor definitely 
excluded the existence of this competence category.  
The most prominent and yet confusing decision regarding the Community’s implied 
competences is undoubtedly Opinion 1/9422 on the competence of the European Community 
to conclude the WTO Agreement. With respect to implied powers, the Court essentially 
proceeded in two steps. First, it asserted that, in the AETR judgment, it was on the basis of 
ex-Article 75(1)(a) “that it held that the powers of the Community extend to relationships 
arising from international law, and hence involve the need in the sphere in question for 
agreements with the third countries concerned.” It further determined, however, that “even in 
the field of transport, the Community’s exclusive external competence does not automatically 
flow from its powers to lay down rules at internal level. […] Only in so far as common rules 
have been established at internal level does the external competence of the Community 
become exclusive.” It then submitted that “unlike the chapter of transport, the chapters on the 
rights of establishment and on freedom to provide services do not contain any provision 
expressly extending the competence of the Community to relationships arising from 
international law”. It hence concluded that it was not possible to infer from those chapters [in 
the Treaties] any exclusive external Community competence (para 81). Equally, the Court 
rejected the Commission’s second contention which was based on Opinion 1/76. It 
emphasised the essential difference to the situation in Opinion 1/76, as well as in the 
Kramer-case. In both cases, the Court contended, the international agreement was 
necessary, in order to (effectively) achieve the respective Community objective. On this 
basis, the Court concluded that “it is understandable, therefore, that external powers may be 
exercised, and thus become exclusive, without any internal legislation having first been 
adopted” By choosing this terminology, the Court thus linked its reasoning in Kramer and 
Opinion 1/76 to the exclusive character of the competence arising pursuant to the ratio of 
these decisions. At the same time, it excluded that this situation applied to the sphere of 
services. It contended that “the attainment of freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services for national of the Member States is not inextricably linked to the treatment 
to be afforded in the Community to nationals of non-member countries or in non-member 
countries to nationals of Member States of the Community.” 
Thirdly, the Court also rejected the Commission’s contention as to ex-Articles 100a and 235 
as legal bases for exclusive external competence. The Court determined that, where 
harmonizing powers have been exercised, the measures thus adopted may limit, or even 
remove, the freedom of the Member States to negotiate with non-member countries. 
“However, an internal power to harmonize which has not been exercised in a specific field 
                                                 
22 Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994, ECR 1994/I-5267.  
       EI  WORKING PAPER NR. 67                                                                  17 
 
 
  
cannot confer exclusive external competence in that field on the Community” (para 88). It 
added with regard to ex-Article 235 that “save where internal powers can only be effectively 
exercised at the same time as external powers […], internal competence can give rise to 
exclusive external competence only if it is exercised.” Also with regard to these findings, it is 
not entirely clear whether the Court established an automatic link to exclusive competence 
as a legal subsumption. It may equally be assumed that the Court, in confining itself to the 
questions submitted, merely excluded exclusive competence without, however, addressing 
the question of (implied) concurrent external competence.  The Court concluded by referring 
to several internal legislative acts that had been adopted on the basis of Treaty provisions in 
the field of services and IP and either relate to the treatment of nationals of non-member 
countries or expressly confer powers to negotiate with non-member countries. It contended 
that whenever such provisions were included in its internal legislative acts, the Community 
acquired exclusive external competence in the spheres covered by those acts (para 95). The 
same should apply, in the absence of any express provision […], where the Community has 
achieved complete harmonization of the rules governing access to a self employed activity, 
as these common rules could be affected if the Member States retained freedom to negotiate 
with non-member countries (para 96).  
The subsequent Opinion 2/9223 of the Court also focused on the definition of exclusive 
implied competences. It referred to the Community’s competence to participate in the Third 
Decision on national treatment of the OECD Council, establishing conditions for the 
participation of foreign-controlled undertakings in the internal economic life of the respective 
member states in which they operate.24 Similar as in Opinion 1/94, the Commission claimed 
an exclusive Community competence on the basis of the AETR principle and Opinion 1/76 
with a reference to the legal bases in ex-Articles 57 and 100a. The Court sought to ascertain 
whether the matters covered by the international agreement in question are either already 
subject of internal legislation containing respective provisions on the treatment of foreign-
controlled undertakings or empowering the institutions to negotiate with non-member 
countries or effecting complete harmonization of the rules governing the right to take up an 
activity as a self-employed person. In those circumstances, according to the Court the 
Community does have exclusive competence to enter into international obligations. Yet, 
while the Court conceded that the Community had adopted measures capable of serving as 
a basis for an exclusive external competence, those measures did not cover all the fields of 
                                                 
23  Opinion 2/92 of 24 March 1995, ECR 1995/I-521. 
24 The measures to which the national treatment rule should apply throughout the OECD member 
countries were (1) government procurement, (2) official aids and subsidies, (3) access to local finance, 
(4) tax obligations and (5) rules applicable to investments other than direct investment operations and 
investment by “direct branches”. 
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activity to which the Third Decision related. It therefore concluded that the Community and 
the Member States “share joint competence” to participate in the decision.  
IV.3. Excursus: Clarifying Implied External Competences?  
 The Court’s Latest Statement in the Open Skies Agreements 
The most recent expression of the Court on implied external competences was in the form of 
its decisions on the Open Skies Agreements, a series of parallel judgments regarding the 
Member States’ competence to conclude air transport agreements25. Since the beginning of 
the 1990’s, the Commission had been urging, without avail, the achievement of a 
comprehensive mandate for the negotiation of a common external air transport system. In 
the meantime, the United States concluded the so-called “Open Skies Agreements” with 
several Member States reserving, among others, external traffic rights for the respective 
domestic carriers. The Commission, having not succeeded in achieving a political mandate, 
chose to take legal action and argued, in essence, that the agreements violated the 
Community’s exclusive external competence. In a similar way as in Opinion 1/94, the 
Commission founded its first claim on Opinion 1/76 and, on similar grounds as in Opinion 
1/94, the Court rejected this assertion. It submitted that the institutions, on the basis of their 
internal powers, could have adopted common rules laying down a concerted action in 
relation to the USA (para 85). It thus stated that the case in question did not disclose a 
situation where internal competence could effectively be exercised only at the same time as 
external competence and, in the light of this, excluded an exclusive external competence. 
Again, the question remained as to whether the Court, when it excluded exclusive 
competence only, implicitly excluded any Community competence on this basis or simply 
refused to examine whether the Community could have concluded the agreement on the 
basis of concurrent implied competences.  
On the basis of the AETR judgement and the "third package" of legislation in the field of air 
transport, the Court went on to judge whether the Community had acquired external 
competence through the exercise of its internal competence. In the context of this analysis, 
the Court issued its most comprehensive statement to date, “under what circumstances the 
scope of the common rules may be affected or distorted by the international commitments at 
issue and, therefore, under what circumstances the Community acquires an external 
competence by reason of the exercise of its internal competence” (para 107-110). According 
to the Court’s preceding case law, this applies 
- “where the international commitments fall within the scope of the common rules 
(AETR judgment, para 30),   
                                                 
25 Compare as one example for the essentially identical set of judgments C-475/98, supra note 14. 
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- or in any event within an area which is already largely covered by such rules (Opinion 
2/91, para 25). In the latter case, the Court specified, Member States may not enter 
into international commitments outside the framework of the Community institutions, 
even if there is no contradiction between those commitments and the common rules 
(Opinion 2/91, paras 25 and 26) (para 108).  
- Thirdly, the Court determined that ”whenever the Community has included in its 
internal legislative acts provisions relating to the treatment of nationals of non-
member countries or expressly conferred on its institutions powers to negotiate with 
non-member countries, it acquires an exclusive external competence in the spheres 
covered by those acts (Opinion 1/94, para 95; Opinion 2/92, para 33) (para 109).  
- Fourthly, and not entirely conclusively, the Court again referred to the existence of 
common rules and stated that “the same applies, even in the absence of any express 
provision authorising its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries, where 
the Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a given area, because the 
common rules thus adopted could be affected within the meaning of the AETR 
judgment if the Member States retained freedom to negotiate with non-member 
countries (Opinion 1/94, para 96; Opinion 2/92, para 33). (para 110) 
Remarkably, following its examination of the regulations applicable in the field of air 
transport, the Court concluded that the "third package" is not "complete in character", thus 
presumably does not constitute complete harmonisation in the understanding of Opinions 
2/92 and 1/94, specifically on the grounds that the regulations do not govern the situation of 
air carriers from non-member countries (para 119). It can be stated that this conclusion 
results from the fact that the regulations in question specifically address the situation of 
Community air carriers alone. Otherwise the AETR-doctrine would lose much of its 
importance if a “complete harmonisation” or the “existence of common rules largely covering 
an area” would be excluded any time that Community legislation does not refer to third 
country nationals. 
The Court finally concluded by examining whether individual provisions of Community 
legislation in that field might be affected by the bilateral agreements. On this basis, it held 
that the Community had acquired exclusive competence to enter into international 
commitments only with regard to individual subject matters, namely the limitation on the 
freedom of non-Community carriers to set fares and rates, as well as obligations relating to 
computerised reservation systems (CRS) offered for use or used in its territory. 
A final remark on this judgment leads back to the issue of concurrent implied competences. 
The Court confirmed in para 111 that “any distortions in the flow of services in the internal 
market which might arise from bilateral `open skies' agreements concluded by Member 
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States with non-member countries do not in themselves affect the common rules adopted in 
that area and are thus not capable of establishing an external competence of the 
Community.” If one applies the concept of implied concurrent competences to this finding, it 
may be stated that the attainment of the Community objective, namely a common air 
transport policy, would be facilitated by the conclusion of an agreement governing the access 
of non-Community air carriers. When the Court generally excluded “an external competence” 
in this situation, this might be understood as a final say on implied concurrent competences. 
Again, however, the judgment focused on the question of to what extent the Member States 
had infringed on the Community’s exclusive competence. Possibly, the Court again chose to 
circumvent the issue, given that it decides upon the essential question, of whether the 
Community would have been entitled to conclude the Open Skies Agreement alone, on the 
basis of its exclusive and concurrent competence. The same would apply with regard to the 
WTO Agreement, which will be dealt with in more detail below in the context of the Common 
Commercial Policy. Last but not least, this arguable and still unresolved question renders the 
significance of the CT’s proposals on implied competences even more apparent. 
IV.4. Rendering Implied Powers Explicit?  
 The CT’s Proposals on Implied Competences 
 IV.4.1. Introduction 
With a view to the complexity of the Court’s jurisprudence, the objective of the Working 
Group on ‘External Action’ with regard to implied external competences was astonishingly 
simple: The Treaty should indicate that the Union is competent to conclude agreements 
dealing with issues falling under its internal competences and the new provision in the Treaty 
should specify that the Council should deliberate on such agreements according to the same 
voting procedure which would apply to internal legislative deliberations on the same issues 
(normally QMV).26 Two provisions in the CT now seek to capture the ECJ’s case law on 
implied external competences.  
Firstly, Art I-13 para 2 CT determines in which cases the Union will have exclusive 
competence for the conclusion of an international agreement:  
“The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an 
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the 
Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or 
insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.” 
 
Secondly, another foundation is provided in Article III-323 CT, in the chapter on the 
conclusion of international agreements of Title V CT: 
                                                 
26 CONV 459/02, p.4. 
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“The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organisations where the Constitution so provides or where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework 
of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Constitution, or is 
provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter 
their scope.” 
 
Five observations can be made at the outset: First, both provisions to some extent seek to 
codify the Court’s findings in AETR and Opinion 1/76 in the Constitution. Second, the two 
provisions only partly overlap and, in essential points, translate the principles on implied 
competences in different ways. Third, it is not entirely clear whether these deviances 
constitute an inadvertence in the drafting procedure. Art III-323 CT had, before its final 
approval in the IGC, been amended by the Working Party of IGC Legal Experts on 11 June 
2004, but the fundamental orientation of this provision remained untouched. Fourth, whilst 
Art I-13 CT undoubtedly refers to exclusive external competences, Art III-323 CT remains 
silent as to the scope of Union competence that it confers.  Fifth, Art III-323 CT confers wider 
powers, but the relation to Art I-13 CT is left open, particularly regarding those parts of the 
provisions which go beyond the scope of Art I-13. In any event, it is submitted that the CT’s 
proposals would confer extensive external powers to the Union. Together with the Union’s 
competences in the proposed version of the Common Commercial Policy that will be dealt 
with below, the Member States’ competences to act in the field of international trade might be 
significantly curtailed. 
Against this background, it seems appropriate to take the individual elements of Art I-13 CT 
as a basis, not the least as it leaves fewer doubts as to what powers it confers, and compare 
each of its elements to the respective corresponding (or deviating) provisions of  
Art III-323 CT.    
 IV.4.2. Implied exclusive powers in the CT… 
 
a. … when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union  
The first element corresponds to the Court’s findings in Opinion 1/94 and 2/92, namely that 
the Union will acquire an exclusive external competence, where internal legislation includes 
provisions expressly conferring on its institutions powers to negotiate with non-member 
countries. Such powers will be limited to the spheres covered by those acts. What remains 
unclear, however, is under which conditions the European legislator may decide to confer 
such powers upon the Union institutions in its legislative acts. Up to now, this question has 
not been addressed in the Court’s jurisprudence. As Stefan Griller has pointed out, however, 
with a view to the principle of conferral which ranks among the fundamental principles in the 
constitution (Art I-11 CT), it is hardly imaginable that the legislator may decide ad libitum to 
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procure external powers to the Union on the basis of any internal Treaty provision (Griller, 
2004:41). To assume that the legislator would be entirely free to donate such powers in laws 
or framework laws, which may eventually be adopted by qualified majority voting, would 
provide it to some extent with the competence to confer competences which would contradict 
the fundamental principles of competence allocation as laid down in the first part of this 
contribution. On the other hand, it is similarly not conceivable that this possibility is only 
limited to such provisions of the Constitution that already contain a link to “relationships 
arising from international law” (Opinion 1/94, para 76), such as Art III-236 para 2b) relating to 
transport which explicitly refers to the operations of non-resident carriers in the Community 
market. As Stefan Griller suggests, it would seem appropriate to only admit the conferral of 
such competences through an act of secondary law, if the conclusion of an international 
agreement at least facilitates the attainment of an internal Union objective (Griller, 2004: 41). 
This would, in fact, correspond to the conditions established for concurrent implied 
competences, as set out above. Even pursuant to this understanding, however, it is 
submitted that this provision, if used in practice by the legislator, may considerably extend 
the Union’s external competences.  
Turning to Art III-323 and the corresponding passage in this provision, it immediately stands 
out that the conditions differ in one remarkable aspect. External competence will arise where 
the conclusion of an agreement is provided for “in a binding Union legal act”. It needs to be 
emphasised that the original version of the CT referred to a “binding Union legislative” act, 
which was amended by the Working Party of IGC Legal Experts only a couple of days before 
the approval of the final text. The Legal Experts had thus apparently not intended to 
assimilate Art III-323 to Art I-13. This leads to the questions of why the difference was made, 
which acts may be addressed that are not already covered by Art I-13 CT and finally, which 
kind of external competence the CT thereby intends to confer. With a view to Art I-33 CT on 
the legal acts of the Union, it seems that the principal application might be the “European 
decisions” which will be non-legislative acts, binding in their entirety. One prominent field of 
application where legislative acts are excluded and where the principally applicable 
instrument would be the European decision is the CFSP. If the current wording of  
Art III-323 CT remains, it would signify that in the future (implied) external competences 
might arise in the CFSP where a European decision in this field so provides. This seems 
particularly interesting with a view to the extension of qualified majority voting in this area. 
What remains unclear, however, is the type of competence that Art III-323 CT in conjunction 
with the respective “binding Union legal act” should confer, as exclusive external 
competences are limited to the conferral of powers through legislative acts. With a view to 
the residual character of this category (Art I-14 para 1 CT), one might consider that it leads to 
a shared competence and the Constitutional Treaty thus finally resolves the questions of 
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(implied) shared competences. Admittedly, however, it remains doubtful, whether this indeed 
reflects the intention of the drafters. 
b.  …or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence 
The second element of Art I-13 CT basically reflects Opinion 1/76. The “inextricable link” 
required between the conclusion of the international agreement and the adoption of internal 
measures for the attainment of a Community objective is formulated pointedly.27  
In contrast, it is again the analogical provision in Art III-323 CT that gives rise to 
bewilderment. It confers competences, “where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary 
in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives fixed 
by the Constitution”. Again the reason remains nebulous as to why the terminology differs in 
such a manner from Art I-13 CT. There is also no explanation in any of the drafting 
documents relating to these provisions. Therefore, it is also difficult to determine which 
concept of necessity will be implied under this provision. If it were the concept of Opinion 
1/76, why then was the terminology of Art I-13 CT not adopted? If one argues that Art III-323 
CT will in effect only constitute a reflection and repetition of Art I-13 CT, as it occurs several 
times in Part I and Part III of the draft, its wording would “leave a lot to be desired”. Yet, if Art 
III-323 were to be interpreted in the light of the Court’s Opinion 1/76, its wording may be 
reconciled with Art I-13. 
Again, the second alternative might be to imply the concept of necessity in the light of shared 
(concurrent) implied competences. The “necessity” (which in the German version is 
translated as “erforderlich”) in Art III-323 CT would then (merely) require that the international 
agreement, in the framework of internal policies, facilitates the achievement of a Union 
objective. In the light of the significantly expanded objectives, particularly in the field of 
external relations, this would again extend the potential scope for external powers to a 
considerable degree. Moreover, as Stefan Griller points out, in the light of the significantly 
extended “legal basis for implied competences” in the first option of Art I-13 CT and the 
extended powers under the Common Commercial Policy, the additional recognition of 
concurrent implied competences in Art III-323 CT seems almost excessive (Griller, 2004:41). 
On the one hand, he thereby refers to the fact that in several fields, explicit provisions of the 
CT confer shared external competences to the Union. This includes, for example, the 
environment (Art III-233 para 4 CT), research, technological development and space (Art III-
248 CT), readmission agreements with third countries (Art III-267 para 3 CT), development 
cooperation (Art III-316 para 2 CT), economic, financial and technical cooperation with third 
countries (Art III-319 para 3 CT) and humanitarian aid (Art III-321 para 4 CT). On the other 
                                                 
27 The fact that the Union has to exercise its competences in order to attain the objectives set out in 
the Constitution is anyway presumed by Art I-11 para 2 CT. 
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hand, as the ECJ has ruled for example in its judgment on the EU-US Energy Star 
Agreement28, the scope of the Common Commercial Policy may also extend to other areas, 
such as the environment, agricultural policy or the internal  market in general that normally 
require specific legal bases.  
c. …or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope 
Finally, in its last element, the CT also takes up the “original” AETR-doctrine, without, 
however, taking account of the Court’s rulings in the specific cases, where an area “is 
already largely covered by such rules” (Opinion 2/91, paras 25 and 26) or “where the 
Community has achieved complete harmonisation in a given area”. Moreover, as Cremona 
observes, also the phrase: “The Union shall have exclusive competence for the conclusion of 
an international agreement […] when its conclusion affects an internal Union act” is 
misleading. She emphasises that it is not the conclusion of the agreement by the Community 
which might or might not affect an internal act but that the conclusion of a particular 
agreement by one or more Member States acting alone might affect those rules or alter their 
scope”.29 However, it is argued that these points may be interpreted in the light of the 
Community acquis, particularly with regard to the Court’s finding that in the case of common 
rules largely covering an area, “Member States may not enter into international commitments 
outside the framework of the Community institutions, even if there is no contradiction 
between those commitments and the common rules”.  
It is also with regard to this last element that finally the provisions of Art I-13 and Art III-323 
CT coincide to the largest extent. This, at least, may be interpreted as a strong indication that 
the two provisions were intended to produce the same legal effects, namely to confer 
exclusive external competence to the Union.  
However, in an overall view an explicit statement seems hardly possible to make and, at 
least, in this regard the CT has accurately continued the line of the ECJ’s jurisprudence: it 
has avoided a clear statement on the existence of implied shared (concurrent) competences 
and left the question as a matter of dispute to academia. But even if it were assumed that 
this competence category would be abolished in the CT (to the extent that it presently exists), 
the external powers conferred upon the Union by Art I-13 CT and III-323 CT are already 
comprehensive. Particularly the conferral of powers through a legislative (or binding) Union 
act, might create considerable dynamics for the Union to act in the international sphere. 
                                                 
28 C-281/01, Commission vs Council (Energy Star-Agreement), ECR 2002/I-12049. 
29 Cremona 2003:1362 with reference to Opinion 2/91, para 9. 
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V. The Union’s External Action: 
  Individual Competence Provisions 
V.1. Introduction 
The following chapter contains an overview on the individual competence provisions 
governing the Union’s external relations in Title V of the Constitutional Treaty. Title V is 
divided into eight chapters. Chapter I, which includes the general provisions, has already 
been dealt with in the previous Section. The implications of these provisions on the individual 
fields of the Union’s external action will, however, be considered in the relevant context. 
Chapter II relates to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the Common 
Security and Defence Policy and Financial Provisions, Chapter III regulates the Common 
Commercial Policy, Chapter IV the Cooperation with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid 
with separate Sections on (i) Development Cooperation, (ii) Economic, Financial and 
Technical Cooperation with Third Countries and (iii) Humanitarian Aid; Chapter V deals with 
Restrictive Measures, Chapter VI contains the provisions on International Agreements, 
relating to the scope and the procedure for the conclusion and negotiation of such 
agreements, Chapter VII determines the Union’s Relations with International Organisations 
and Third Countries and Union Delegations and, finally, Chapter VIII regulates the 
Implementation of the Solidarity Clause.  
V.2. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (Art III-294 – III-313)  
 V.2.1. General Observations 
Despite the merging of the pillars, the introduction of a single legal personality and the 
integration of the CFSP and CSDP under the general umbrella of “Union external action”, the 
CT highlights several times that the CFSP maintains its specific status. Ultimately, one may 
state that, despite the outwardly uniform structure, the pillar structure re-enters through the 
backdoor. The separate competence category for the CFSP in Part I CT (Art I-12 para 4 and 
I-16 CT) provides a first indication. It displays the reluctance to apply either of the legal 
consequences attached to the categories of shared competences or the area of supporting, 
coordinating or complementary action to the CFSP. The concept of shared competences 
contains the principle of pre-emption which the Member States refused to apply to the CFSP. 
Yet, obviously it did not seem to constitute an appropriate solution either to simply exclude 
pre-emption, similar to the example of development cooperation.30 Categorizing the CFSP as 
area of supporting, coordinating or complementary action, as another alternative, might have 
been perceived as a poor signal on the way to developing a strong Union common foreign 
and security policy. Possibly, with a view to the persisting, significant differences regarding 
                                                 
30 Compare Cremona, 2003:1353ff. 
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procedures, instruments and organs dominating the CFSP, one might even state that it was 
the most "honest" solution to provide for a separate competence category.                    
Art I-40 para 6 CT expressly excludes legislative acts in the field of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy; simply put, this implies that the CFSP remains the business of the executive, 
with the European Parliament, in principle, being only a supporting actor in this field. It needs 
to be only consulted and regularly informed, but has no participation in decision-making. 
Moreover, the CFSP remains the only field where the EP does not have to be consulted by 
the Council for the conclusion of international agreements (Art III-325 para 6 CT). Also, the 
role of the Commission is still not as strong as it is, by comparison, in other fields of 
Community competences. The dominant actors remain the European Council, whose role 
has been significantly enhanced, and the Council of Ministers. In addition, the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ continues to be excluded (Article III-376 CT). A novelty in the CFSP is certainly the 
introduction of a single set of instruments to the CFSP: The current Common Strategies, 
Common Positions and Joint Actions give way to the European decision which will be the 
main instrument applicable in the CFSP. As Cremona observes, this bears a certain 
integrative element, as there will by definition be no distinction between European decisions 
under the CFSP and other Community competences, such as for example under Articles I-
59, III-165 para 2 or III-172 para 6 CT (Cremona, 2003:1354). However, as indicated above, 
whilst the European decision even has similar characteristics as the legislative act, this may 
be misleading, as the essential factor remains the procedure applied for the adoption of such 
acts which varies depending on the relevant legal base which is applicable. Thus, it is in 
particular the procedural differences, the exclusion of the legislative procedure, the 
institutions involved and unanimity as the principal voting requirement which determine the 
continuing special character of the CFSP.31  
An important expression of this specific character is constituted by Article III-308 CT which 
provides that “the implementation of the CFSP shall not affect the application of the 
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Constitution for 
the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles I-13 to I-15 and I-17” and vice-
versa. Following the merger of the pillars and the introduction of a single legal personality, 
the non-interference between the CFSP and external competences currently based in the 
first pillar gains additional significance. With a view to the persisting differences regarding 
organs, instruments and applicable procedures in the CFSP, it remains at issue that the 
current supranational fields of external relations will, in the future, not also be dominated by 
the intergovernmental sphere. Presently, the primacy of Community law is explicitly regulated 
                                                 
31 Compare however CIG 38/03, according to which some delegations in the Intergovernmental 
Conference want qualified majority to be the general rule or at least extended in the field of CFSP. 
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in several provisions of the TEU, namely Art 1, 2, 3 and particularly 47 TEU.32 The Court has 
ruled upon the primacy of Community law in its decisions in Leifer, Werner and Centro-Com33 
with respect to acts adopted under the Common Commercial Policy. In Leifer and Werner, 
the Court stated that “a measure whose effect is to prevent or restrict the export of certain 
products cannot be treated as falling outside the scope of the CCP on the ground that it has 
foreign and security objectives” (Werner, para 10).  In Centro-Com, it added that “even where 
measures have been adopted in the exercise of national competence in matters of foreign 
and security policy, they must respect the Community rules adopted under the CCP” (para 
30). Also under the Constitutional Treaty, it will be for the European Court of Justice to 
monitor compliance with Article III-308 (Art III-376 CT). Yet, it is questionable whether, 
following the merger of the pillars and with no provision in the Constitution securing the 
primacy of the present supranational fields, the Court would continue this line of 
jurisprudence.34  Taken together with the European Council’s powers under Art III-293 CT, 
there is the potential that the influence of intergovernmental mechanisms in the Constitution 
could increase. 
Moreover, there are several areas in the Constitution, where delimitation between the CFSP 
and the other fields of external relations will imply significant consequences. First, Art III-325 
CT on the conclusion of international agreements stipulates that the right of proposing the 
opening of negotiations, the voting modalities as well as the inclusion of the European 
Parliament differ, “if an agreement exclusively or principally relates to the CFSP”. Another 
open question concerns the effects of international agreements in the CFSP. The special 
procedures and characteristics of Union agreements under Article 24 TEU have been 
abolished. This particularly refers to the Member States’ possibility under this provision to 
subject the binding character of the agreement to compliance with the respective national, 
constitutional requirements. Yet, it is not clear whether agreements in the CFSP should have 
the same binding force as agreements falling under the current Community sphere or 
whether they will, similar to the whole field of the CFSP, maintain a specific character.35 As 
the CFSP was taken out of the general competence categories, it is doubtful whether any of 
the respective categories, exclusive or shared, should apply for the conclusion of 
                                                 
32 Regarding the relationship between current first and second pillar and the precedence of 
Community powers on for specific forms of foreign policy over the CFSP refer to Eeckhout, 
2004:151ff.  
33 C-70/94, Werner, ECR1995/I-3189, C-124/95, The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com, ECR 1997/I-81, C-
83/94, Criminal proceedings against Leifer and others ECR 1995/I-3231. 
34 Also compare in this regard the Court’s jurisprudence in the Airport Transit Visa case, C-170/96, 
Commission versus Council, ECR I-2763 on the delimitation of competences between the first and the 
third pillar; for a detailed discussion compare Griller in de Witte, 2003: 136ff. 
35 Compare, however, the general provision in Art III-323 para 2 CT that stipulates without reservation 
that ‘agreements concluded by the Union are binding on the institutions of the Union and on its 
Member States’. 
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international agreements in this area. In addition, given the exclusion of the ECJ’s jurisdiction 
in the CFSP, it is also questionable who will determine the effect of Union agreements in the 
CFSP sphere on Member State competence?36 Other areas, where the delimitation between 
the CFSP and the current supranational fields of external action is of relevance are the 
European Council decisions on the basis of Art III-293 CT, as set out above, as well as the 
Union’s cooperation policy and the implementation of restrictive measures, as will be further 
outlined in Chapters V.4. and V.5. below.  
In summary, it may be stated that despite a partly stronger coherence in the field of external 
action, the artificial separation of the economic and political aspects of external relations still 
persists in the draft. Given the inextricable link between economic and political concerns, 
which is even more strongly knotted in the Constitution with the inclusion of foreign policy 
objectives in the area of the commercial policy, its delimitation becomes more and more 
impracticable in political reality.37   
 V.2.2. The Proposed New Competence Provisions in the CFSP/CSDP  
a. Introduction  
Looking at the individual competence provisions in Title V, it seems that the Articles on CFSP 
do not contain any radical changes to the current Title V TEU. The emphasis is still on 
broadly worded objectives rather than a precise delimitation of subject matter or a definition 
of the kind of competences conferred upon the Union (Eeckhout, 2004:139). Following the 
abolition of specific CFSP objectives and their integration in commonly defined targets for the 
entire field of external relations, the definition of CFSP competences will certainly not 
become easier. In contrast, substantive amendments were made in the CSDP38, where the 
Constitutional Treaty, above all, sought to increase the Member States’ obligations to provide 
military and civil capacities and to procure mutual assistance in the case of crises. At the 
same time, the competence provisions in the CSDP involve an increased element of 
flexibility by focusing on a long-term or case by case cooperation of certain groups of 
Member States (Cremona, 2003:1360).  
The general legal basis for CFSP and CSDP in Part I of the Constitution is provided in Art I-
12 para 4 CT. “The Union shall have competence to define and implement a common foreign 
and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy.” 
According to Art I-16 CT, this competence covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions 
relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
                                                 
36 Compare Cremona, 2003:1352. 
37 Griller/Weidel in Griller/Weidel, 2002:6. 
38 The differentiation between CFSP and CSDP in this contribution shall not withstand the fact that the 
CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP (Art I-41 para 1).   
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policy, which might lead to a common defence. Member States are obliged to support the 
Union's common foreign and security policy and adhere to the acts adopted in this area 
(Art I-16 para 2). A first notable difference in the draft lies in the determination of the political 
statement contained in Art I-41 para 2 CT providing that the progressive framing of a defence 
policy will, and not only might, lead to a common defence, when the European Council acting 
unanimously, so decides (compare current Art 17 TEU). The European Council will by 
decision recommend to the Member States the adoption of a decision in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements (Article I-41 para 2). This statement is 
accompanied by the expansion of the Petersberg tasks referred to in current Art 17 para 2 
TEU to which other missions have been added.39 They will forthwith also include “joint 
disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and post-
conflict stabilisation” (Art III-309 CT).40 In the light of the most pertinent global security 
challenges, the Treaty explicitly emphasises that “all these tasks may contribute to the fight 
against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their 
territories” (Art III-309 CT). With a view to these extended objectives, the requirements to 
provide the Union with the necessary operational capacity for the implementation of the 
CSDP, increases simultaneously (Art I-41(3)). The Member States’ are obliged to procure 
such capacity, which draws on both civil and military assets, in order to contribute to the 
objectives defined by the Council in relation to the respective tasks (Art I-41(3) and III-
309(2)). They will, however, continue to have a right of veto with a view to their commitments 
in the CSDP, as European decisions on defence policy must still be adopted unanimously 
(Art I-41 (4) CT).  
The most relevant substantive innovations introduced in the CSDP are threefold: the 
application of several mechanisms of flexibility, including the possibility for structured 
cooperation, the introduction of a mutual defence clause and lastly the establishment of a 
European Defence Agency.  
b. Areas of Flexibility in the CSDP  
Forms of flexibility in the CSDP have many faces in the draft Constitution. On the one hand, 
“the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are 
willing and have the necessary capability for such a task” (Art III-310 CT). The participating 
Member States, in association with the Union minister for Foreign Affairs, will agree among 
                                                 
39 As Duke provides, “one explanation for the relatively easy expansion of the Petersberg tasks may 
be that the question of competences, at least on paper, is becoming less relevant with the prospect of 
an EU Foreign Minister who, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant 
contact with the Political and Security Committee “shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military 
aspects” of the above tasks (Art III-309 CT) (Duke, 2004: 21). 
40 As set out in Art I-41 para 1 CT, the Union may use its operational capacity also for missions 
outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in 
accordance with the principles of the United Nation Charter.  
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themselves on the management of the task. The Council is kept regularly informed of the 
progress and consequences in the implementation.41 On the other hand, the draft 
Constitution foresees a permanent structured cooperation for “those Member States whose 
military capability fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to 
one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions” (Article I-41 para 6 and 
Article III-312 CT). This is a remarkable novelty, given that enhanced cooperation in the field 
of security and defence was explicitly excluded in the TEU (Art 27b TEU). Member States 
that wish to participate and fulfil the criteria regarding the military capabilities set out in the 
respective Protocol in the Constitution will notify the Council.42 Within three months following 
such notification, the Council will adopt a European decision establishing permanent 
structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States (Art III-312 
para 2 CT). It will be open to other Member States subject to a vote by the Council of 
Ministers with the participation of those Member States already taking part in the group 
(Article III-312 para 2 CT). The dividing lines between these two forms of flexibility in the 
CSDP are thus the qualitative requirements for military capability of the participating Member 
States, as well as the quality or respectively the challenges of the missions and the ad hoc 
character of Art III-310 CT. Yet, how these differences will apply in conceptual and practical 
terms seems not entirely clear (Duke, 2002:24).    
c. The Mutual Defence Clause 
The second major innovation in the CSDP is the mutual defence clause in Art I-41(7) CT. 
Whilst it was initially, under the Convention’s draft, also designed as a form of flexible 
cooperation, the final concept of the Union’s mutual defence clause now obliges all Member 
States to aid and assist “by all the means in their power” another Member States that is “the 
victim of armed aggression on its territory”, in accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. This comprehensive obligation constitutes a significant challenge 
particularly for the neutral and non-aligned countries, such as Austria, Finland, Ireland and 
Sweden, and also Denmark with a view to its specific position in the CSDP. It, however, 
takes account of potential political or even constitutional conflicts by stating that this clause 
“shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States”. At the same time, it avoids challenging the role of NATO by providing that 
the “Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, 
                                                 
41 As Cremona observes, those Member States will then be committed to the task as defined in the 
relevant European decision, thus they will not have complete freedom of action and if it should provide 
necessary to amend those parameters, a further European decision by the whole Council of Ministers 
will be necessary. These provisions constitute the legal basis for such operations as in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic republic of Congo (Cremona, 2003:1360). 
42 Refer to Protocol 23 in CIG 87/04, ADD1. 
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remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.” 
Therefore, a clear line is established to Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty, which should take 
priority over any application of Art I-41(7) CT. Whether this concerns also the scope of the 
defence clause, in the sense that Art I-41(7) CT also excludes pre-emptive action on the 
basis of proven threats in compliance with the standard interpretation of Art 51 of the UN 
Charter, is unclear. It might be implied by the requirement in Art I-41(7) CT that commitments 
in this area will be consistent with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Yet, with a view to 
the differences regarding the legality of military action in Kosovo and Iraq, it is not clear 
whether there exists a uniform position on these questions within the EU.  
d. The Solidarity Clause 
Another form of mutual assistance, which is not regulated within the section on CSDP, but in 
fact also concerns potential security threats against any of the Member States, is the 
Solidarity Clause (Article I-43 and Article III-329 CT). With a view to the current challenges of 
global politics, practical recourse to this provision seems even more imminent than situations 
under the mutual defence clause. Art I-43 CT establishes an obligation to assist a Member 
State that becomes a victim of a natural or man-made disaster or a terrorist attack, at the 
request of its political authorities. In this event, Union and Member States are called to act 
jointly, in a spirit of solidarity, subject to coordination in the Council of Ministers. The Union 
will mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, which notably includes also the military 
resources made available by the Member States, intelligence, police and judicial 
cooperation, civil protection, etc.43 Similar to the provision on mutual defence, the scope of 
obligation under the solidarity clause is not entirely clear: Principally, the objectives of Art I-
43 CT are the prevention of threats or the assistance in the event of a threat or other disaster 
in the territory of the Member States. The second indent of Art I-43(1)(a), however, also 
foresees the implementation of the solidarity clause, in order to “protect democratic 
institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack” without any specification as to 
where such measures will take place. Again, therefore, the scope of such competence may 
be questioned and, particularly, whether its formulation might permit pre-emptive action on 
the basis of proven threats, contrary to the obligations under public international law (Art 51 
UN-Charter). Read in isolation of the Union’s international obligations, a preventive military 
action for example in Afghanistan, in the case of terrorist threats against any of the Member 
States by a fundamentalist group, cannot be excluded.  
                                                 
43 Compare CONV 461/02 (Final Report of Working Group Defence), p.20; generally, the 
arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause referred to in Article I-43 
shall be defined by a European decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the 
Commission and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Council shall act in accordance with 
Article III-300(1) where this decision has defence implications. The European Parliament shall be 
informed. 
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e. The European Defence Agency 
The last significant amendment in the CSDP that will be addressed is the legal basis for 
establishing a European Defence Agency in Art I-41(3) and Art III-311 CT. It is regulated in 
the context with the Member States’ obligation in Art I-41(3) CT “to make civilian and military 
capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the CSDP […]”. In consequence 
of this obligation, “Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military 
capabilities”.44 To this end, the Constitution authorises the establishment of an agency in the 
field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisitions and armaments. Its tasks 
include promoting the harmonisation of operational needs, initiating or coordinating 
multinational projects or programmes with regard to the objectives in terms of military 
capabilities and fostering research activities and the industrial and technological base in the 
defence sector (Art III-311(1) CT). Remarkably, the Agency will also contribute to defining the 
Member States’ military capabilities objectives and evaluate the observance of the capability 
commitments given by the Member States (Art III-311(1)(a) CT), although it is not even 
obligatory that all Member States take part in the endeavour. That is to say that also the 
European Defence Agency constitutes a sort of flexible cooperation, as it “shall be open to all 
Member States who wish to be part of it”. Moreover, “specific groups shall be set up within 
the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects”. Similar to other fields 
of the CFSP/CSDP, the Agency will bring about an interesting constellation regarding the 
institutions involved . The Agency’s statute, seat and operational rules will be defined by the 
Council, acting by qualified majority (Art III-311(2) CT)45. The Agency itself will act subject to 
the authority of the Council (Art III-311(1)), which presumably refers to the Foreign Affairs 
Council and hence the Union Foreign Minister, and at the same time will carry out its task in 
liaison with the Commission where necessary (Art III-311(2) CT). Remarkably, even before 
the formal signing of the Constitution, the Council has already adopted a Joint Action 
establishing the European Defence Agency with the mission to support the Council and the 
Member States in their effort to improve the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis 
management and to sustain the ESDP46. 
In summary, the Constitution includes important amendments to the CSDP, particularly by 
broadening the Union’s competences through the extension of the Petersberg tasks and 
including several new legal bases allowing for a flexible integration and, thus, the possibility 
                                                 
44 Compare in this regard the Final Report of the Convention’s Working Group on Defence which 
clearly stated in the context of the European Defence Agency that  “the development of capabilities is 
linked to development of armaments” (CONV 461/02, 24).  
45 Presumably, all Member States and not only the participating states shall take part in the decision-
making, as the following sentence explicitly requests that “that decision should take account of the 
level of effective participation in the Agency’s activities.  
46 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence 
Agency, OJ L245/17 of 12 July 2004; for a more detailed outline on the European Defence Agency 
refer to Blanck, 2005:27-30.  
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for a stronger progression of “coalitions of the willing” in the defence sector.47 Taken together 
with the comprehensive obligations of mutual defence and solidarity assistance, it may be 
undoubtedly concluded that one “achievement” of the Constitution was to strengthen at least 
the legal basis for a Common Defence Policy to a considerable degree.  
V.3. The Common Commercial Policy: (Art III-314 and III-315 CT) 
Chapter III of Title V on the Common Commercial Policy contains two provisions: Art III-314 
CT on the establishment of a customs union between the Member States and Art III-315 CT 
which constitutes the considerably amended version of current Art 133 TEC. In the external 
sphere, the customs union as well as the common commercial policy is (explicit) exclusive 
competence as specified by Art I-13(1)(e) CT. Cremona interprets the common commercial 
policy as an expression of the principle that an exclusive competence of the Union arises, 
where the Community’s internal market objectives are dependent on the conclusion of 
international agreements. The attainment of its objectives excludes the maintenance of an 
autonomous external trade policy by the Member States.48 
Article III-314 CT basically reflects Article 131 TEC with the significant complement, however, 
that it will henceforth also contribute to the progressive abolition of restrictions on foreign 
direct investment and to the lowering of customs and other barriers. As Herrmann provides, 
the inclusion of non-tariff barriers and foreign direct investment (hereinafter: FDI) in the 
scope of the Common Commercial Policy constitutes another indication for the ambitious and 
comprehensive global commercial policy aspired by the CT. It corresponds to the extension 
of the Union’s objectives in the field of external action through Art III-292 CT which in his 
view constitutes an expression of the Union’s aspiration at international level to find and 
defend its own consensus on the equilibrium between economic and non-economic trade 
aspects towards the outside world.49 With a view to these objectives, agreements concluded 
under the CCP might, in the future, also be reviewed with regard to their capacity of 
furthering sustainable development. It is also questionable, how trade agreements with 
countries that do not respect human rights should be legally evaluated in the light of the 
human rights-objective under Art III-292 CT.  
                                                 
47 Another indication for a more efficient operation of the CSDP is the provision on financing in the 
Constitution (Art III-313 CT). Principally the Constitution maintains the approach of charging 
expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications to the Member States in 
accordance with their respective gross national product scale. Yet, for the urgent financing of 
initiatives in the framework of the CFSP, and particularly preparatory activities for the Petersberg 
tasks, the Constitution foresees the establishment of specific procedures guaranteeing rapid access to 
appropriations in the Union budget (Art III-313(3)). In addition, in order to finance preparatory activities 
for Petersberg tasks, a start-up fund made up of Member States’ contributions shall be established. 
48 Cremona, 2003:1362f. 
49 Herrmann, 2004:23, Cremona, 2003:1349. 
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Also, the amendments to the scope of the CCP, as currently regulated in Art 133 TEC, would 
bring about a significant development in the sphere of the international economic law. The 
proposal in the CT aspires to resolve the compromise adopted in the Nice-version, between 
those who felt that the Union's external powers were unnecessarily limited through the 
Court's ruling in the WTO-Opinion and those who dreaded a further extension of the Union's 
competences. It seems that the Convention, after the drawback of Opinion 1/94, now tends 
to take up the extensive interpretation of exclusivity first adopted by the ECJ in Opinion 1/78. 
Last but not least, the proposal would entail one significant gain, namely the simplification of 
the current "legal monstrosity"50created under the Nice Treaty. 
Currently, the Union’s competences under the Common Commercial Policy include the 
adoption of tariff rates, quantitative restrictions, antidumping measures, anti-subsidy 
measures against unfair trade practices, export policy and the conclusion of tariff and trade 
agreements. With regard to the WTO-Agreement, the ECJ clarified in Opinion 1/94 that 
besides the Agreement on trade in goods, only selected fields of trade in services and 
intellectual property are covered by (now) Art 133 TEC. Of the "four modes of the supply of 
services" identified by the Court, only the cross-frontier supply of services was held to fall 
under the scope of the Common Commercial Policy. With regard to the TRIPS Agreement, 
only IP protection regarding the release into free circulation of counterfeit goods was under 
the Court’s ruling covered by Art 133.In addition, the conclusion of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers and on Agriculture falls under exclusive Community competence under 
the CCP. As a consequence, the Union’s external powers appeared somewhat fragmented in 
relation to the substantive agenda of the WTO.  
Following the Nice-Treaty, the trade aspects of services and IP rights were included in the 
Common Commercial Policy, yet with several restrictions. First, following the predominant 
interpretation of Art 133 paras 5 and 6, the TEC only established concurrent competences in 
these areas.51 Second, Art 133 para 5 TEC only covers the conclusion of international 
agreements regarding services and IP, and does not include autonomous EC-measures, 
which emphasises the foreign trade aspect of Art 133 TEC. Third, the emphasis on trade 
aspects of services and intellectual property also clarifies that intra-Community aspects are 
not covered by Art 133 TEC and fall under the domain of internal competences. Fourth, 
pursuant to the prevailing understanding, the notion of services under the EC-Treaty does 
not cover the establishment of a commercial presence in another Member State, thus the 
setting up of a branch or a subsidiary.52 A different understanding might only seem 
                                                 
50 Herrmann, 2004: 2 (loose translation). 
51 Griller in Hummer, 2002:131. 
52 A national of a Member State who pursues a professional activity on a stable and continuous basis 
in another Member State where he holds himself out from an established professional base to, 
amongst others, nationals of that State, comes under the provisions of the […] right of establishment, 
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admissible if one applies the notion of services under the GATS Agreement to Art 133 TEC.53 
The reasons for defending this interpretation might be appealing if examined on the basis of 
its practical implications: With a view to the liberalisation of the financial markets, for 
example, the Union may achieve harmonisation in the field of financial services on the basis 
of its internal competences, and might exercise its (exclusive and/or concurrent) competence 
for concluding international agreements on cross-border financial transactions or the supply 
of financial services by credit institutions located in third countries. The broad understanding 
of services under the GATS Agreement would also permit the conclusion of international 
agreements regulating the conditions for the first establishment of subsidiaries or branches of 
such credit institutions within the Community. In turn, the limited scope of the Community's 
definition of services would exclude such external competence relating to the establishment 
of subsidiaries or branches. Thus, throughout the Community different rules regulating the 
market access and the national treatment of such institutions may result in considerable 
distortions of competition, including forum shopping with a view to the Member States 
offering the most beneficial conditions. The drawback of the strict Community interpretation is 
evident in the light of this example. However, as Gamharter and Griller have convincingly 
argued, the negotiating history of Art 133 TEC preceding the Nice Treaty, the ensemble of 
Art 133 TEC with its inherent exceptions, which provides no adequate basis to align the 
Community competences with the WTO agenda, as well as a systemic interpretation of this 
provision in the framework of the EC-Treaty strongly speak in favour for applying the EC-
notion of services under the Common Commercial Policy.54 Thus, whilst the active and 
passive freedom of services is covered by the CCP, the third mode of supply in the 
terminology of GATS remains outside the scope of the Union's competence under Art 133 
TEC. 
Against this background, it may be observed that the CT's proposal in Art III-315 CT would 
significantly broaden the scope of the Common Commercial Policy. The relevant passages of 
this provision include the following:  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
and not those…relating to services” (Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165). In turn, freedom to 
provide services includes investment insofar as it concerns the establishment of infrastructure such as 
an office, chambers or consulting rooms, as long as the “temporary nature of the activities in question” 
is not lost. 
53 Compare Vedder, 2001:31, as well as Eeckhout, 2004:215. 
54 Griller/Gamharter, 2002:91f. 
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1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly 
with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements 
relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of 
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in 
the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted 
in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. 
2. European laws shall establish the measures defining the framework for 
implementing the common commercial policy. 
4. For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the 
Council shall act by a qualified majority. For the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously where 
such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of 
internal rules. 
The Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements: 
(a) in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these agreements 
risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity; 
(b) in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where these 
agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and 
prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them. 
5. The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport 
shall be subject to Section 7 of Chapter III of Title III and to Article III-325. 
6. The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the field of the common 
commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union 
and the Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory 
provisions of the Member States insofar as the Constitution excludes such 
harmonisation. 
The first observation evidently relates to the scope of competences in the proposal, which 
extends exclusive Union competence under the CCP to the conclusion of tariff and trade 
agreements relating to services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights, as 
well as foreign direct investment. Unchanged remains the reference to trade aspects of 
services and IP rights. The principal but undoubtedly significant change is the limitation of the 
Member States’ competences, as they would be entirely excluded from concluding 
international agreements in these areas. Under the current regime, on the basis of the 
concept of pre-emption in the sphere of concurrent competences, the Member States retain 
external competence to the extent that the Community has not acted. Pursuant to the CT, the 
Member States would be ab initio precluded from setting any external action. It would be 
exclusively upon the European Union to negotiate and conclude agreements in the 
respective areas. Indirectly, it would compel the Member States to reach agreement within 
the Council, if they wish to participate in the development of a certain subject matter at 
international level. 
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An important extension of the Union’s room for manoeuvre would also be effected by the 
inclusion of foreign direct investment in Art III-315 CT. Whilst it is submitted that “trade in 
services” would, also in the future, have to be interpreted in accordance with the EC- notion 
of services, the inclusion of foreign direct investment in Art III-315 CT would (finally) also 
bring the establishment of a “commercial presence” under the scope of the CCP.55  
Therefore, FDI would, as well as its focus on questions concerning the capital market, also 
imply an exclusive Union competence regarding international agreements on the 
establishment of third country residents and undertakings. If, therefore, the proposal was 
adopted in its current version, including trade in goods, services and IP, as well as foreign 
investment supplemented by the Union’s exclusive competences pursuant to Art I-13 CT, 
namely in particular the field of competition, the Union’s external powers in international trade 
would be impressive. Herrmann even suggests that the Union would practically “govern” all 
aspects on the WTO-agenda and would be solely entitled to sign a final agreement at the 
current Doha development round.56 With a view to the parallel WTO-membership of the 
European Community and the Member States, he even raises the question on the 
consequences for a revision of the Agreement pursuant to Art X WTO-Agreement, if the 
Member States were not entitled anymore to translate amendments to the Agreements.57 
Indeed, the Member States’ margin of manoeuvre to conclude international commercial 
agreements, and more generally to adopt rules on services, IP and foreign direct investment 
that relate to third country nationals, would be reduced to a considerable degree. Moreover, it 
may be expected that the conclusion of an international agreement in a certain field also 
provides an incentive for an internal regulation, for example on the basis of the Union’s 
concurrent competences. Cremona regards the new wording of the CCP as another attempt 
to extend the Union’s competence in this field beyond its traditional application; an attempt, 
which has in her view already been shown in the course of the debate within the European 
Convention on whether the four freedoms should become an exclusive Community 
competence (Cremona. 2003:1361f). Notwithstanding this proposal, which has eventually 
been dropped in the course of negotiations, it remains at issue to what extent the CCP would 
lead to a ‘tacit expansion of exclusive EU competences’ in its fields of application.58 That is to 
say that also in the CT’s proposal, it is submitted that only conventional measures, meaning 
the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, and not autonomous measures are covered 
                                                 
55 This may be based on the argument that the maintenance of a permanent commercial presence in a 
country inevitably includes an investment decision (Griller/Gamharter in Griller/Weidel, 2002:93f) 
56 Herrmann, 2004: 26. 
57 Herrmann, 2004: 26f.  
58 Griller, 2003:138, on the proposal to bring the entire Common Commercial Policy under exclusive 
competence: ‘The point of such concerns is that as a result of expanding the CCP in this manner, 
Member States would no longer be competent to regulate services and intellectual property rights with 
regard to nationals of third countries.’ 
58 CONV 528/03, Comments to Article 11 and CONV 797/1/03, Article I-12 para 1. 
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with regard to trade in services and IP as well as FDI. Thus, either a third country or an 
international organisation must participate in a Union measure.59 This seems to be the more 
convincing interpretation, even though one might state that the scope of application in Art III-
315 para 1 CT is not conclusive and the reference in para 2 to European laws as measures 
for the implementation of the CCP serves to establish Union competence also for 
autonomous measures.60 Yet, it would seem that the wording of para 1 is unequivocal and, 
what’s more, the provision in para 6, which stipulates that the exercise of competences under 
the CCP will not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member 
States, would otherwise lose its meaning. This provision intends to delimit the external from 
the internal sphere and seeks to prevent the exclusive character of the powers under the 
CCP encroaching upon the internal delimitation of competences. In turn, the primacy of 
Union law and the Member States' commitment under Art I-5 para 2 CT to ensure the 
fulfilment of the obligations flowing from the Constitution or from the Union institutions' acts, 
prevents a conflict between the international agreements concluded by the Union and the 
exercise of internal competences by the Member States.  
The second phrase of Art III-315 para 6 CT also sets limits to the Union's external 
competence, in that the exercise of the competences under the CCP will not lead to 
harmonisation where this is excluded in the internal sphere. Notably, this concerns the entire 
area of supporting, coordinating or complementary action (Art I-17 CT), where the Union may 
in fact not enter into any international commitment that would imply the establishment of 
common rules at Union level. In addition, several other competence provisions, such as 
employment (Art III-207 CT), or, in the field of shared competences, Social Policy (Art III-210 
CT), as well as research and development, or development cooperation and humanitarian 
aid (Art I-14 para 3 and 4 CT) to some extent prevent harmonisation. Pursuant to Art III-315 
para 4 CT, the internal requirements for unanimity also translate to the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and IP, as well as FDI. In this 
regard, the proposal contains another amendment compared to the Nice version as regards 
agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services. The rather incoherent 
attribution of such services as mixed competence established under the Nice version in 
Art 133 para 5 which mainly resulted from the Member States', and particularly the French 
concern to protect domestic cultural services was dropped. Instead, the general CCP 
competence allocation principally also applies to trade in cultural and audiovisual services. 
The Member States' sovereignty concerns are addressed by the requirement of unanimity 
where the conclusion of agreements in these fields risks prejudicing the Union's cultural and 
linguistic diversity. Moreover, the exclusion of any harmonisation of the Member States’ laws 
                                                 
59 Compare Griller/Gamharter in Griller/Weidel, 2002, 90f. 
60 Compare also Herrmann, 2004: 24; differently Eeckhout, 2004. 
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and regulations in the field of culture pursuant to Art III-280 para 5 CT needs to be 
considered. As set out above, it excludes the establishment of common rules at the external 
level. This applies equally to the fields of trade in social, education and health services, 
where the conclusion of agreements will also be subject to a unanimity requirement, where 
such agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and 
prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them.  
Finally, para 5 sets out that the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the 
field of transport will be subject to the specific provisions of Section 7 on Transport in Title III. 
Thus, the field of transport services remains outside the exclusive CCP competence and, 
following the most recent judgment of the ECJ on the Open Skies Agreements, the largest 
part of this sector gives rise to (only) shared external competence of the Union and the 
Member States. Thus, irrespective of whether FDI will or will not form part of the CCP, the 
area of transport will constitute a gap in the Union’s near-complete powers in international 
trade. A last, brief remark relates to the procedural aspects of the CCP which would bring 
about an increased role of the European Parliament. In accordance with Article III-325 para 
6(b) CT, the European Parliament will for the first time be given the right to be consulted, 
where an agreement under the CCP is concluded.  
V.4. Cooperation with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid  
 (Art III-316 to III-321 CT) 
 V.4.1 Introduction  
Chapter IV of Title V on the Union’s cooperation policies covers one of the main pillars of EU 
external action. Measures adopted on the basis of these provisions extend to practically all 
countries in the world and cover all essential areas of cooperation with third countries, 
including economic, social and political aspects. The Union’s cooperation policy is thus 
another field which displays the strong link between trade or economic relations and foreign 
policy aspects.61 Articles III-316 to III-321 CT essentially reflect the provisions on 
development cooperation in the current Art 177 TEC, as well as economic, financial and 
technical cooperation with third countries in Art 181a TEC. Art III-321 CT moreover 
introduces a new competence provision on humanitarian aid, for cases of ad hoc assistance, 
relief and protection for people in third countries and victims of natural or man-made 
disasters.  
                                                 
61 Compare the statement of the Commission and the Council, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/index_en.htm, according to which it is the task of the 
Community to ensure that development policies and trade and investment policies are complementary 
and mutually beneficial (p.6). 
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These provisions have been the result of a gradual development of the Community’s 
cooperation policy. In its original version and until Maastricht, the TEC did not contain any 
specific legal basis for development cooperation or cooperation with third countries. The 
development of policies in these areas was largely based on (current) Art 310 TEC 
(Association Agreements)62 or Art 133 TEC (Common Commercial Policy).63 Yet evidently, it 
conflicts with the very purpose of Art 310 TEC to conclude association agreements with all 
developing countries. Also the CCP is not the appropriate legal basis to cover all aspects of 
development policy.  Maastricht finally introduced the current Art 177 TEC and established 
development cooperation formally as an area of Community policy.64 Its objectives included 
amongst others the sustainable economic and social development of the developing 
countries, the campaign against poverty and the gradual integration of these countries into 
the world economy. It thus offers a broad margin to define the actual content of cooperation 
with third countries. The Court, in turn, has interpreted the scope of the nature of the 
Community’s competence in this field more narrowly by providing that cooperation 
agreements must not impose on the Community “such extensive obligations concerning the 
specific matters referred to that those obligations in fact constitute objectives distinct from 
those of development cooperation”.65 This particularly implies that the Community could not, 
through cooperation measures, affect internal legislation in fields other than development 
cooperation (Martenczuk, 2002:393). On the other hand, as is emphasised in Art 177(2) 
TEC, the objectives of development cooperation will be taken into account in all Community 
policies which are likely to affect developing countries. Above all, this refers to the 
delimitation between development cooperation and the Common Commercial Policy, or  the 
close co-existence between trade, economic or technical cooperation and other forms of 
cooperation intended to strengthen democratic and human rights values in third countries.  
                                                 
62 Compare for example the earlier Lomé Conventions which have been now replaced by the so-called 
Cotonou-Agreement with the ACP-countries (Council Decision 2003/159/EC of 19 December 2002 
concerning the conclusion of the Partnership Agreement between the African Caribbean and Pacific 
Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other 
part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000) which is also based on Art 310 TEC; Compare hereto 
Schmalenbach in Callies/Ruffert, ad Art 177, para 3.  
63 Compare, for example the Council regulation on the cooperation agreement with the Asian and Latin 
American countries which are based on Art 133 in conjunction with Art 181 (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1440/80 of 30 May 1980 concerning the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Economic Community and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - 
member countries of the Association of the South-East Asian Nations, OJ L 144/1; also the regulation 
on the Generalised System of Preferences (Regulation 2501/01, OJ L 346/1) is based on Art 133 
TEC, although it pursues development policy objectives; compare moreover the Court’s broad 
approach on CCP in Opinion 1/78, where it took Art 113 TEC to cover commodities agreements or in 
the GSP-case where the Court decided that unilateral trade preferences for developing countries also 
came within the scope of the Common Commercial Policy. 
64 For an historical background on the development cooperation, refer to Martenczuk in Griller/Weidel 
(2002). 
65 Case C-268/94, Portugal versus Council, [1996] ECR I-6177, para 39. 
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The Nice Treaty inserted another title in the field of cooperation policy, governing economic, 
financial and technical cooperation with third countries (Art 181a TEC). It codified a long 
standing Community practice of concluding cooperation agreements or including cooperation 
provisions in general agreements with non-developing countries, which until then had to be 
based on current Art 308 TEC.66 In terms identical to Art 177(2) TEC, Art 181a TEC is also 
designed to contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy 
and the rule of law, and to further the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Yet, in contrast to Art 177 TEC, it specifically addresses the cooperation with countries or 
regions other than developing countries, including industrialised countries. The subject 
matter of such cooperation in the Treaty is defined in broad terms and, as Eeckhout sets out, 
removes the need for recourse to different Treaty provisions depending on the subject of 
cooperation (Eeckhout, 2004:117).67 Nevertheless, to the extent that such measures fall 
under the scope of other Community policies, in particular to the common commercial policy, 
the more specific legal basis will prevail (Martenczuk, 2002:407). An exclusive Union 
competence under the CCP would, for example, continue to exist to the extent that 
Community measures pursuing development objectives have as an essential goal to 
determine commercial or agricultural policy.68  
Through the introduction of a common set of objectives, the emphasis to extend the Union’s 
cooperation, and particularly development policy objectives to all fields of external action has 
become even stronger (Art III-292(2) CT). This applies particularly to the respect for human 
rights, democracy or the rule of law which frequently is a condition for financial or economic 
assistance in development or trade agreements with third countries. Yet, also the fostering of 
“sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries” (lit d) 
explicitly ranks among the general objectives of the Union’s external action. These 
commitments for the future implementation of the Union’s external action, as well as the 
further extension of competences in cooperation policy appear to aim at an enhanced Union 
engagement in this field.69 
                                                 
66 Compare, for example, Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000, OJ L 311/1 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic 
and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, as well as Council 
Regulation 443/92, OJ L52/1 governing financial and technical assistance and economic cooperation 
with the developing countries of Latin America and Asia (ALA). 
67 An agreement providing for technical cooperation in matters of transport, environmental protection 
and agriculture, for example, does not need to be based on the express or implied external powers in 
those areas (Eeckhout, 2004: 117). 
68 Schmalenbach in Callies/Ruffert, ad Art 180 para 1 and Art 179 para 3; C-268/94, Portugal versus 
Council, ECR 1996/I-6177, ad para 39. 
69 Compare Working Document 29 of Working Group  “Complementary Competences”; similar 
Schmalenbach in Callies/Ruffert, Art 180, para 1; compare also Zimmermann/Martenczuk in 
Schwarze, Art 177, para 14. 
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 V.4.2. The New Provisions of the Constitution on the Cooperation  
  with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid  
Both Art 177ff TEC and Art 181 TEC stipulate that the Community policy in the sphere of 
cooperation policy shall be “complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States”.  
Yet, despite this clear wording in the Treaty, Community measures in the field of 
development cooperation in practice go beyond a mere coordination of Member States’ 
policies. As the Convention’s Working Group on “Complementary Competences” observed, 
the preferred legal instrument for Community action in development cooperation is 
regulations, which would under the definition chosen imply shared competence. The Group, 
however, also stated that development cooperation has special features because Union 
activities in this field would never pre-empt the competence of the Member States to maintain 
their own national development policy. It is thus presupposed that Member States will 
continue to have their own development policies.70  
The Constitutional Treaty takes account of this specific nature of the Union’s development 
policy. Art I-13 CT categorises development cooperation and humanitarian aid as shared 
competences. At the same time, it provides that the exercise of Union competence in this 
field to take action and conduct a common policy may not result in Member States being 
prevented from exercising theirs (Art I-13 para 4 CT). The principle of pre-emption, normally 
inherent in the context of shared competences, does not apply in these areas. Consequently, 
Art III-316 in Part III of the Constitution stipulates that the Union's development cooperation 
policy and that of the Member States will complement and reinforce each other and that the 
Union’s external powers in the field do not prejudice the Member States competences to 
negotiate in international bodies and to conclude agreements (Art III-316 and III-317(2) CT). 
The same applies to economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries (Art 
III-319 CT)71 and humanitarian aid (III-321 CT).  
                                                 
70 CONV 375/1/02, REV 1, p.9, compare also Working Document 29 of Working Group  
“Complementary Competences”, where it is proposed that development policy, as a sub-category of 
shared competence could be parallel competence; compare also Schmalenbach in Callies/Ruffert ad 
Art 180, para 1; see also Zimmermann/Martenczuk in Schwarze, ad Art 177, para 14. 
71 Interestingly, the field of economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries (Art III-
221) is not specifically attributed to a competence category in Part I CT, unless one assumes that the 
reference in Art I-14(4) CT relates to the entire chapter on cooperation with third countries and 
humanitarian aid. Yet, also Art III-319(3) CT foresees that in the sphere of external relations, the 
Member States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude international 
agreements shall not be prejudiced by the exercise of Union competences in this field. On the basis of 
this provision, the systemic integration of Art III-319 CT in Chapter IV of Title V and the residual 
character of shared competences, it may be concluded that also Art III-319 CT confers shared 
competence by excluding pre-emption.  
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 V.4.3. Development Cooperation (Art III-316 to III-318 CT) 
A substantial novelty in the provision on development cooperation is the emphasis on the 
primary objective of reducing and, in the long term, eradicating poverty (Art III-316 para 1 
CT). Despite the general obligation in Art III-292 CT, Art III-316 para 1 CT once more 
underlines the Union’s commitment “to take account of the objectives of development 
cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”. 
Both Union and Member States are moreover held to “comply with the commitments and 
take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and 
other competent international organisations” (Art III-316 para 2 CT). Internally, development 
cooperation policy will be implemented through European laws or framework laws, as well as 
multi-annual cooperation programmes. Art III-317 CT contains the legal basis for the 
conclusion of agreements with third countries and competent international organisations to 
achieve the objectives referred to in Articles III-292 and III-316 CT. Also, the European 
Investment Bank is held to contribute, under the terms laid down in its statute, to the 
implementation of development cooperation policy (Art III-317 para 3 CT). Art III-318 CT 
furthermore includes a mutual obligation for coordination and consultation between Union 
and Member States, “in order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action”.  
 V.4.4. Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Third  
  Countries (Art III-319 and III-320) 
Art III-319 CT essentially reproduces current Art 181a TEC. It empowers the Union to carry 
out economic, financial and technical cooperation measures, including assistance and, in 
particular financial assistance, with third countries other than developing countries. A 
progress in comparison to Art 181a TEC is certainly the introduction of the legislative 
procedure for decision-making. The requirement for unanimity regarding agreements under 
Art III-319 CT with countries that are candidates for accession remains unchanged. 
An additional legal base is awarded in Art III-320 CT for adopting the necessary European 
decisions, when the situation in a third country requires urgent financial assistance. It allows 
the Council to adopt such measures by qualified majority, instead of unanimity, as is 
presently the case under Art 308 TEC.72  
 V.4.5. Humanitarian Aid (Art III-321) 
The provision on humanitarian aid may be regarded as another necessary extension of the 
Community competences in the field, following the current practice of Community action. It 
                                                 
72 Art III-320 would provide the appropriate legal basis for the regulation on the rapid reaction 
mechanisms covering the reaction to crises both in developing and non-developing countries, which 
was adopted on the basis of Art 308 TEC. 
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entitles the Union to implement operations for ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for 
people in third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet 
the humanitarian needs resulting from these situations (Art III-321 para 1 CT). Such 
operations will be concluded in compliance with the principles of international law and with 
the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination (Art III-321 para 2 CT). As 
became evident in the Bangladesh case73 decisions on emergency aid, and particularly the 
financial assistance linked to such decisions, brought about some difficulties regarding the 
legal basis in the Treaty for a Community humanitarian aid policy. (Eeckhout, 2004:108)74. In 
this judgment, the Court allowed Member States to collectively finance emergency aid and 
taking decisions when meeting in the Council, yet acting outside the framework of the Treaty 
and of the budget. The current provision in the Constitution brings matters of humanitarian 
aid within Union competence. This might also entail implications with regard to budgetary 
matters, given that the main issue of dispute underlying the Bangladesh case was the 
Parliament’s claim that the Member States’ decisions on emergency aid infringed its 
budgetary prerogatives. With a view to the “complementary” character of this policy and 
notwithstanding the coordination with Union actions, Member States may still continue to 
pursue independent operations.  
V.5. Restrictive Measures (Art III-322 CT) 
The provisions on economic and financial sanctions against third countries have all along 
rendered the inextricable link between CFSP and external relations under the current first 
pillar apparent, both in procedural as well as in substantive terms. Generally, embargo 
sanctions are imposed by an authority against another subject of international law in 
pursuance of a foreign policy objective, namely to alter the conduct of the target State.75 Art 
III-322 incorporates current Articles 301 TEC on economic and Art 60 TEC on financial 
sanctions and, in terms of procedure, maintains the two-stage approach provided for in Art 
310 TEC for the adoption of sanctions.76 This is particularly noteworthy with a view to the 
merger of the pillars. In fact, it provides another confirmation that, also in a “unified” 
Constitution, the Member States’ concerns to hand over sensitive foreign policy instruments 
are successfully addressed through the persisting procedural safeguards in the CFSP. For 
the interruption or reduction of economic or financial relations pursuant to Art III-322 CT the 
                                                 
73 Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91, Parliament vs. Council and Commission, [1993] ECR I-3685. 
74 Compare also Regulation 1257/96, OJ L 163/1, 2 July 1996 which constitutes the basis fort he 
Commission’s humanitarian activities world-wide and has been adopted as an thematic instrument on 
the basis of Art 179(1) TEC. 
75 Compare Lukaschek in Griller/Weidel (2002) 324 referring to Schneider (1997) 27f. 
76 The structure of this provision introduced through the Treaty on European Union has been preceded 
by a long standing practice of a combined approach, namely the adoption of sanctions on the basis of 
a consensus decision with in the EPC followed by a Community measure based on former Art 113 
TEC; for a detailed account on the European Union’s legal framework on economic sanctions, 
compare Lukaschek in Griller/Weidel (2002): 322-354. 
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Council thus needs to adopt a (principally) unanimous European decision in the framework of 
the CFSP. On the basis of such a decision, the Council, acting by qualified majority, will 
adopt the necessary European regulations or decisions. 
Evidently, a unanimous Council decision as necessary precondition for the adoption of 
sanctions, though most probably unavoidable from a political point of view, is a rather 
challenging requirement in a Union of 25 Member States. It substantially weakens an 
otherwise powerful trade and policy instrument in the hands of the Union. Moreover, the 
unanimity requirement comprises another important facet with a view to the competence 
allocation for the adoption of sanctions. Notably, Art III-322 CT is not assigned to a specific 
competence category. On the basis of the general rule in Art I-14(1) CT, one might therefore 
argue that it figures as a shared competence. This conclusion somewhat contradicts the 
current perception of Art 301 TEC which is that of an exclusive competence77 or, 
alternatively, suggests that the scope of the Union’s competence depends on the repartition 
of powers in the field of the respective embargo measures78. Following the latter approach, 
for example, the “classical” trade sanctions covered by the Common Commercial Policy-
competence are exclusive. In contrast, on the assumption that the competence to adopt 
economic or financial sanctions was shared in the Constitution, the Member States would be 
principally free to adopt autonomous sanctions, as long as the Union had not acted in a given 
case. This would become problematic in each case where the adoption of a measure in the 
Council was blocked for the lack of unanimity. 
With a view to the quest for a more coherent and consistent approach in the field of external 
relations, this solution seems entirely inappropriate: Particularly with a view to the Union’s 
comprehensive exclusive powers in the field of the Common Commercial Policy, it should be 
out of question that the Member States adopted autonomous trade sanctions. The more 
plausible approach would therefore be to not interpret Art III-322 CT as a genuine 
empowering provision, which for this reason already does not fit in the general system of 
competence categories. On this basis, the division of competences would depend on the 
individual case. As long as the Union did not adopt sanctions against a third country, an 
individual or non-State entity, the Member States would be free to take such embargo 
measures that are not in conflict with any of the Union’s exclusive competences. This might 
include flight embargos in the field of transport, visa restrictions, or eventually the freezing of 
                                                 
77 Compare for example Cremer in in Callies/Ruffert, ad Art 301 para 14 and fn.63. 
78 Compare for example Lukaschek in Griller/Weidel (2002): 345f; this would, for example imply that a 
measure on the basis of Art 301 TEC, which also encompassed services, would on the basis of 
Opinion 1/94 only confer concurrent competence. This view would, however, contradict a systematic 
interpretation of the Treaty, as Art 60 TEC extends the competence for adopting measures under Art 
301 TEC to the field of capital and payment and explicitly foresees in its para 2 in exceptional cases, a 
(concurring) competence of the Member States for serious political reasons and on grounds of 
urgency. 
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accounts in the field of capital and payment. In contrast, it would prevent the Member States 
from adopting any trade sanctions with a view to the Union’s exclusive competence under Art 
III-315 CT. Art III-322 CT would thus be understood as a horizontal competence provision, 
conferring power on the Union only in those fields, where the Union’s legislator is internally 
entitled to act. This approach would also seem in line with the Member States’ interest to 
retain control on the implementation of this important foreign policy instrument. For reasons 
of efficiency and coherence at the international stage, however, it would have seemed 
preferable to institute a general exclusive embargo competence for the Union and to ease 
the requirements for decision-making. In any event, it should be added that the issue is put 
into perspective in practice, as a great proportion of the Union’s embargo measures are 
adopted to implement the decisions of the UN-Security Council that are mandatory for all 
Member States. Nonetheless, it speaks for itself that the Constitution, similar as for the 
CFSP, avoids clarifying the competence for this hybrid legal basis.     
In substantive terms, Art III-322 CT reacts to the current practice and global security 
challenges by extending the scope of “addressees” in the provision. Economic and financial 
sanctions may forthwith be applied not only against States, but also against natural or legal 
persons and non-State groups or bodies (Art III-322 para 2 CT). Currently, this would, in 
principle, only be possible on the basis of Art 308 TEC and thus subject to unanimity.  
Finally, it should be added that the provisions on restrictive measures, though clearly 
involving foreign security aspects, are not part of the chapter on CFSP and, therefore, fall 
within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. This also includes a review under the 
current Art 230 TEC regarding the legality of restrictive measures adopted by the Council. 
The Court’s jurisdiction in this field might gain importance with a view to the future 
relationship between the CFSP and current supranational fields of external action, and the 
associated institutional and procedural prerogatives in the Constitution. It may become 
pertinent with a view to the delimitation to Art III-325 (9) CT, which constitutes the second 
provision in the Constitution for “sanctioning” third countries by suspending the application of 
an existing agreement. Whilst the adoption of a sanction pursuant to Art III-322 CT requires 
“a CFSP measure”, thus unanimity within the Council, followed by a Council regulation, the 
suspension of an economic agreement comes under the CCP and can in principle be done 
upon proposal by the Commission and qualified majority within the Council. Thus, if 
unanimity in the Council cannot be achieved and the Commission, nevertheless, considers 
the adoption of sanctions necessary, it might seek to tempt a qualified majority within the 
Council by proposing to suspend an agreement with the country in question. If this were 
among the tasks of the Union Foreign Minister in his function as External Relations-
Commissioner, yet simultaneously head of the Foreign Affairs Council, he/she might indeed 
face a difficult decision concerning whether or not to push for the adoption of such proposal 
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within the Commission. A lack of unanimity in the Council expresses that the adoption of 
sanctions is not considered an appropriate foreign policy instrument in a given case. Yet, 
without considerably affecting the scope of application of Art III-325(9) CT, this should not 
prevent a “sanction”, namely the decision to suspend an agreement, if the necessary quality 
majority is reached, although it contradicts the foreign policy interests of certain Member 
States.   
It all comes down to the extent of the institutions’ commitments pursuant to Art III-292 para 3 
CT to “ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action”. Practice will 
show in which fora (the External Action Service?) and under whose aegis (the Foreign 
Minister) these commitments will be implemented and to what extent the obligation for 
consistency may be enforced or even challenged in a Court’s action. 
V.6. International Agreements (Art III-323 to III-325) 
 V.6.1. The legal basis for the conclusion of international agreements 
  (Art III-323 CT) 
The questions relating to the Union's substantive powers for concluding international 
agreements in the Constitution have been discussed above in relation to the Union’s implied 
powers under Art III-323 para 2 CT79. In the context of this provision, it should suffice to 
summarise that Art III-323 CT empowers the Union to conclude an international agreement 
with one or more third countries or international organisations where the Constitution 
(explicitly) so provides or, respectively, on the basis of its implied powers. It is therefore not a 
genuine competence provision, but entitles the Union to conclude international agreements 
where there is an appropriate legal basis in the Constitution80 or where an external 
competence arises implicitly through provisions of the Treaty or secondary law. With regard 
to the effect of these agreements Art III-323 para 2 CT provides that they “are binding on the 
institutions of the Union and on its Member States”.  
 V.6.2. Association Agreements (Art III-324 CT) 
Art III-324 CT literally reproduces current Art 310 TEC entitling the Union to “conclude an 
association agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations in order 
to establish an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and 
special procedures”. The concept of “association” remains undefined in the Constitution, yet 
                                                 
79 Refer to Chapter IV.4. 
80 This, for example, includes the Union’s competences to include international agreements in the field 
of the environment (Art. III-233(4)), research, technological development and space (Art. III-248), 
readmission agreements with third countries (Art. III-267 (3)), development cooperation (Art. III-
316(2)), economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries (Art. III-319(3)) and 
humanitarian aid (Art. III-321(4)). 
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probably gathers a more narrow scope of application with the newly introduced provision on 
neighbourliness agreements (Art I-57 CT) and the Union’s extended competences in the field 
of cooperation policy (Art III-316 to III-321 CT). Following the pertinent judgment of the ECJ 
in Demirel81, the key elements of an “association” should be the creation of special, 
privileged links with the country in question and its participation, at least to some extent, in 
the Community system. For this reason, namely to extend the system of the Treaty for the 
relevant policy areas to the associated country, the Court established an extremely broad 
external Union competence.82 As Eeckhout points out, however, even where the judgment 
was among the most expansive in Community competence, it did not much change the 
practice of concluding association agreements in mixed form, particularly because of the 
necessary underlying political dialogue (Eeckhout, 2004:106). According to Art III-325 para 8 
CT, moreover, unanimity as well as the consent of the European Parliament is required for 
the adoption of association agreements. Agreements aiming to establish closer (economic, 
social or political) links with third countries without the inherent “promise” of accession might 
equally be based on Art I-57 CT or, for example Art III-319 CT. For these agreements, the 
Council may normally act by qualified majority83; the European Parliament would have to give 
its consent in the case of agreements subject to Art III-319 CT (Art III-325(6)(a)(v)CT) or after 
having been consulted in the case of neighbourliness agreements.84  
 V.6.3. The Union and its Neighbours (Art I-57 CT) 
A specific legal basis for the future of the Union’s relationship with its neighbouring countries 
is enshrined in Part I of the Constitution, directly ahead of the Title governing Union 
Membership (Title IX). In conjunction with Art III-225 CT, it empowers the Union to conclude 
agreements with neighbouring countries, in order to “develop a special relationship […] 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of 
the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.” Similarly 
as for association agreements, the neighbourliness agreements may contain reciprocal rights 
and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly (Art I-57 para 2 CT). 
In substance, however, the objective target of Art I-57 CT is different. It pictures a product of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), initiated by the Commission and essentially 
designed to “prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its 
neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through 
                                                 
81 Case 12/68, Demirel versus Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719. 
82 In the case of Demirel, this included for example also aspects of immigration and employment of 
third country nationals.  
83 Notably with the exception of agreements subject to Art III-319 with accession candidates. 
84 The Parliament’s consent for the conclusion of neighbourliness agreements might only be required, 
if such agreements established specific institutional framework (Art III-325(6)(a)(iii) CT).  
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greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation”.85 In its outline on the 
neighbourhood policy, the Commission emphasises that the ENP is distinct from the issue of 
potential membership, yet offers a privileged relationship with the Union’s neighbours. 
Together with partner countries, it aims to define a set of priorities, whose fulfilment will bring 
them closer to the European Union. The countries currently  covered by the European 
Neighbourhood Policy are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, as well as the Palestinian 
authority.  
 V.6.4. The Procedure for the Conclusion and Negotiation of International 
  Agreements (Art III-325 CT) 
Article III-325 CT regulates the procedural aspects of international agreements. Its major 
achievement is to apply a single provision to the negotiation and conclusion of practically all 
EU agreements, including also the CFSP and PJCCM (police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters) agreements that are currently regulated in Art 24 TEU86.  Specific 
provisions are only foreseen for the common commercial policy (Art III-315 CT) and for 
international agreements in the field of monetary matters (Art III-326 CT). Without entering 
the details on the procedure, the main innovations are outline briefly below. 
As Art III-325 CT covers agreements both in the fields of the CFSP and current Community 
matters, several features preserving the more intergovernmental approach in the CFSP are 
apparent in the procedure. Either the Commission or, where the agreement relates 
exclusively or principally to the CFSP, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs may recommend 
the opening of negotiations (para 3). The Council nominates the Union negotiator, 
presumably following the current practice, either the Commission or the Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, or where an agreement covers both CFSP and Community matters. As has 
been set out above, the European Parliament unfortunately remains entirely excluded with 
regard to CFSP agreements. In contrast, its role has been enhanced in other areas. The 
Parliament’s consent is required for agreements in all fields, where the legislative procedure 
applies (para 6)87. Most notably, this is the case for all PJCCM matters, where the 
Parliament’s role has thus proceeded from no involvement to consent. On the same basis, 
the Parliament’s consent will also be required for agreements under the CCP, where it 
currently has no formal role. Also in the framework of the Constitution, the role of the 
Parliament remains, however, limited to the conclusion of agreements. The negotiating 
                                                 
85 Further information on the objectives and methods of the ENP are available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/policy_en.htm.  
86 For PJCCM matters, Art 24 TEU applied by reference in Art 38 TEU, entitling the EU to conclude 
international agreements in third pillar matters.   
87 Under Art 300 (3) TEC, the Parliament’s power of assent was in this regard limited to agreements 
requiring an adopted act to be amended under the co-decision procedure.  
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phase, which is essential for the shape and substance of the agreement, will continue to be 
determined by the Council and Commission and the Union Foreign Minister. Regarding the 
voting modalities, qualified majority continues to be the principle, except for association 
agreements, agreements referred to in Art III-319 (economic, financial and technical 
cooperation) with the States which are candidates for accession, as well as those fields for 
which unanimity is required internally for the adoption of a Union act (para 8). Important also 
is the power of the European Court of Justice to render opinions as to whether an agreement 
envisaged is compatible with the Constitution (para 11). In the context of a cross-pillar mixity 
thus agreements covering both CFSP matters as well as Community aspects of external 
relations, the Court’s jurisdiction might constitute another potential playing field for defining 
the future relationship between the former pillars.88 
Finally,  the provision on suspension of agreements (Art III-325 para 9 CT), which has been 
mentioned above in the context of Art III-322 CT on restrictive measures is noteworthy. In 
contrast to the two stage procedure that applies to economic and financial sanctions, the 
suspension of an agreement is conducted by a European decision of the Council, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission or the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, as has 
been discussed above, the suspension of agreements mostly constitutes a highly sensitive, 
political act. It is thus striking that the Constitution remains silent on the European 
Parliament’s participation in these decisions. This might either imply that the Parliament has 
no say in such decisions or, analogous to Art III-325(6)(b) CT, would at least need to be 
consulted.  
V.7. The Union’s Relations with International Organisations and Third 
 Countries and Union Delegations (Art III-327 to III-328 CT) 
In a sort of catchall-provision at the end of Title V, the Constitution entitles the Union to 
“establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the United Nations and its 
specialised agencies, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development”, and “as are 
appropriate with other international organisations” (Art III-327 CT). The provision furthermore 
contains a rather curious directive on its implementation as “the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and the Commission”, presumably by the Council “shall be instructed to implement 
this Article” (Art III-327(2) CT). 
As mentioned above in Chapter III.3.1, Art III-328 CT finally empowers the Union delegations 
to represent the Union in third countries and at international organisations. They are placed 
                                                 
88 Regarding the conclusion of such agreements in the case of a cross-pillar mixity, compare the 
contrasting positions of Griller in de Witte (2003), 151 and Eeckhout (2004), 184; for a discussion on 
the hierarchy of international agreements compare Lechner, 2004: 23. 
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under the authority of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and will act in close cooperation 
with Member States' diplomatic and consular missions. 
VI. Summary   
The attempt to analyse the future of the Union’s external relations is necessarily limited by 
two factors: On the one hand, as has been stated earlier, this relates to the uncertainty as to 
whether the Constitutional Treaty will actually enter into force, which will, at the earliest be 
determined by the end of 2006.89 The second factor, presuming a successful ratification 
procedure, concerns the extent to which the potential that is undoubtedly yielded in the 
Constitutional Treaty will be implemented in practice. This potential may, notably, shift the 
Union into several directions, including a stronger intergovernmental orientation in the 
Union’s external relations, or indeed, a more coherent role of the Union in the world, based 
on its extended economic competences and a successful implementation of the institutional 
amendments. Eventually, the CT might also hold up the artificial separation of economic and 
political aspects of external relations which currently persists. 
The (merely preliminary) findings on the Union’s future role in the field of external relations 
may, therefore, be summarized as follows. 
(i) Regarding the definition of competence-categories and the attribution of 
competences, the CT provides for stronger clarity and transparency by essentially 
codifying the present competence regime. With a view to the Union’s external 
competences, however, there are controversial developments: On the one hand, the 
CT significantly expands the Union's exclusive competences, particularly in the field 
of the Common Commercial Policy, which implies a move towards integration and 
centralisation, even putting at risk the flexibility and dynamics of the system. On the 
other hand, the draft implies the inherent danger of a stronger intergovernmental 
orientation of the entire field of external relations through the predominant role given 
to the European Council.  
(ii) In spite of the factual perpetuation of the pillar structure with regard to the proposed 
design of the CFSP, the competences of the Union in the field of external relations 
have been strengthened as a whole. This applies particularly to the field of economic 
external powers. The extension of the scope of the CCP together with the CT’s 
proposal on implied competences in Art I-13 and III-323 CT might in the future even 
empower the Union to conclude international agreements, such as the Open Skies-
Agreement, as well as to sign a final agreement at the current Doha development 
round alone, on the basis of its exclusive as well as concurrent competences.  
                                                 
89 Regarding the state of play on the ratification procedure, refer to 
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/referendum_en.htm.  
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(iii) The introduction of generalized objectives governing the entire field of external action 
(Art III-292 CT) implies the obligation for a broader orientation of the Union, also in 
the area of economic external relations. This might particularly bring about a stronger 
consideration of non-economic trade aspects in the implementation of the Common 
Commercial Policy.  
(iv) By looking at the individual competence provisions in Title V, the ever-closer link 
between foreign policy and economic aspects of external relations becomes visible, 
particularly in the area of restrictive measures or the Union’s cooperation policies. 
Through the persisting differences in the institutional and procedural provisions 
between CFSP and the current supranational fields of external action, moreover, the 
delimitation between the two “pillars” remains at issue. The commitment to ensure 
consistency between the different areas of external action will thus become a core 
challenge for the Union’s institutions, and particularly the Union Foreign Minister.  
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